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Article 
The Interagency Marketplace 
Jason Marisam† 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal agencies routinely contract with each other to ex-
change money, regulatory power, and governmental services.1 
Collectively, these interagency exchanges create a vast public 
institution that I call the interagency marketplace. The inter-
agency marketplace is governed by a set of constitutional and 
statutory rules that, despite their everyday significance to 
agencies and substantial impact on the administrative struc-
ture, have been largely overlooked by public law scholars. In 
this Article, I offer a comprehensive descriptive and normative 
account of the legal rules governing the interagency market-
place. 
This Article is part of a burgeoning field of scholarship on 
law and interagency coordination.2 The literature here has so 
far focused on how various legal institutions improve inter-
 
†  Visiting Assistant Professor, Hamline University School of Law; Post-
Graduate Research Fellow, Harvard Law School. J.D., Harvard Law School. I 
would like to thank Daryl Levinson, Matthew Stephenson, Jody Freeman, 
Adrian Vermeule, and David Barron for helpful comments and advice. Copy-
right © 2012 by Jason Marisman. 
 1. See infra Part II. 
 2. See generally, e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as 
Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217 (2005) (arguing that Congress should en-
courage interagency lobbying as a means of improving agency outcomes); Jody 
Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE 
L.J. 795 (2005) (describing a “modular” approach to agency regulation, as op-
posed to more traditional approaches); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1 (manu-
script at 1) (analyzing the methods by which agencies can more efficiently co-
ordinate efforts over shared regulatory spaces); Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping 
and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 
201 (making the case that courts should not undermine jurisdictional regimes 
that feature overlapping authority between multiple political institutions); Ja-
son Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (2011) (explor-
ing the causes, implications, and solutions to duplicative delegations to admin-
istrative agencies).  
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agency coordination largely by ensuring that one agency takes 
into account the actions or interests of other agencies regulat-
ing in the same area.3 This Article fills a gap in this literature 
by looking at how the vast, yet unexplored, interagency mar-
ketplace can be used to improve decision making, by allowing 
agencies to better take advantage of each other’s regulatory ex-
pertise and experience.  
Like all marketplaces, the interagency marketplace is de-
signed to facilitate exchanges among parties.4 But the rules 
governing the interagency marketplace are not and should not 
be the same as the rules governing private marketplaces. Un-
like in private marketplaces, the central actors in the inter-
agency marketplace are public officials who run executive 
agencies.5 Thus, the rules for the interagency marketplace must 
not only aim to improve efficiency but also to promote govern-
ment accountability and preserve the balance of powers among 
the branches of government. 
The Constitution provides two simple default rules for the 
interagency marketplace that apply in the absence of statutory 
authority to the contrary: (1) after Congress delegates authori-
ty to an agency, that agency cannot redelegate the authority to 
a different agency;6 and (2) after Congress appropriates money 
to an agency, that agency cannot transfer the funds to a differ-
ent agency.7 These two constitutional rules quashed most activ-
ities in the interagency marketplace until 1932, when Congress 
passed the Economy Act.8  
The Economy Act provides the most comprehensive statu-
tory framework governing the interagency marketplace.9 Con-
gress passed the Act to invigorate the interagency marketplace 
and generate governmental efficiencies,10 which the Act does in 
two ways. First, by allowing agencies to obtain services from 
each other in exchange for money, the Act lets agencies tap into 
 
 3. See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1 (manuscript at 1–3). 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. This power is derived from the Necessary and Proper Clause. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 7. See id. § 9 (stating that Congress, and Congress alone, may appropri-
ate funds from the Treasury). 
 8. 31 U.S.C. § 1535 (2006). 
 9. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, 
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 12-22 to -76 (3d. ed. 2004) 
[hereinafter REDBOOK]. 
 10. See id. at 12-22 to -26. 
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each other’s expertise and infrastructure without having to 
waste money building up their own duplicative expertise and 
infrastructure.11 Second, the Act allows agencies to save money 
by hiring other, more efficient agencies to perform tasks for 
them.12  
Today, Economy Act agreements—that is, interagency 
agreements made under the authority of the Economy Act—are 
a routine part of agencies’ operations.13 Agencies often use the 
Act to hire other agencies to administer their programs, ana-
lyze data, perform studies, oversee regulated entities, train 
personnel, and so on.14 
However, the Economy Act by no means creates a free 
market for interagency services. The Act and its jurisprudence 
lay out a comprehensive set of procedures and rules that con-
strain exchanges in the interagency marketplace. Most im-
portantly, the Act severely restricts the conditions under which 
an agency can transfer power to another agency. An agency can 
only redelegate tasks if: (1) the agency “retains responsibility” 
over the tasks; (2) the tasks are not part of the agency’s prima-
ry administrative functions; and (3) the tasks do not involve 
significant decision-making authority, such as the authority to 
issue binding rules and regulations.15 The Economy Act also 
limits interagency fund transfers—most critically by barring 
agencies from realizing profits from the interagency services 
they provide.16 Under the Act, an agency can only recoup the 
actual costs of its services.17 It cannot receive any money in ex-
cess of that amount.18  
Among other claims, I argue that these Economy Act re-
strictions on interagency redelegation and agency profits 
should be relaxed. In particular, I propose amending the Econ-
omy Act to authorize an agency to redelegate a reasonable 
amount of its authority to a qualified agency. Expanding 
redelegation powers in this way would allow agencies to fix in-
 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See, e.g., Letter from Katherine V. Schinasi, Managing Dir., U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Office, to Joshua B. Bolton, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget 
(Sept. 27, 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05960r.pdf (not-
ing a marked increase in interagency transactions). 
 14. See REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 12-54 to -68. 
 15. See infra Part I. 
 16. See REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 12-38. 
 17. 31 U.S.C. § 1535(b) (2006). 
 18. Id. 
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efficient jurisdictional arrangements by reassigning authority 
to the agency best-positioned to regulate. To check the potential 
abuse of these expanded powers, I would boost the procedural 
constraints that currently apply to Economy Act agreements. 
In particular, I would amend the Economy Act to subject all 
redelegation proposals to notice-and-comment procedures and 
grant standing rights that would allow aggrieved parties to 
challenge redelegations in court. Moreover, to protect the bal-
ance of powers among the branches of government, I would bar 
the redelegation of authority from independent agencies to cab-
inet departments or other dependent agencies that are less in-
sulated from presidential influence.  
I also propose amending the Economy Act to authorize 
profits for agencies providing services in the interagency mar-
ketplace. There is no principled reason why an agency provid-
ing services under an interagency agreement should be prohib-
ited from realizing some share of the efficiency gains generated 
by the agreement. Allowing profits would create a financial in-
centive for budget-minded agency officials to provide services 
for other agencies—a good outcome if one assumes that agen-
cies are typically hired by other agencies because of their supe-
rior expertise and capabilities. I also propose several other 
amendments to the Economy Act that would remove re-
strictions on interagency fund transfers. 
At first glance, proposals to grant agencies greater 
redelegation powers and profit-earning capabilities may appear 
radical. In our constitutional system, two of the most important 
legislative checks on executive power are Congress’s ability to 
set agencies’ powers and to set agencies’ budgets.19 By allowing 
agencies to broaden their powers through redelegation and 
augment their budgets by profiting from interagency services, 
my proposals seem to circumvent these fundamental constitu-
tional checks.  
However, when viewed in light of the historical practices in 
the interagency marketplace, my proposals appear less like 
radical departures and more like sensible updates to a body of 
law that has fallen behind the times. In our modern regulatory 
environment, where the most pressing problems span multiple 
 
 19. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 298 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 
2009) (“[The] power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most com-
plete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immedi-
ate representatives of the people . . . .”). 
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agencies’ expertise and jurisdictions,20 the law should do more 
to facilitate interagency agreements that let agencies collabo-
rate and cooperate. Moreover, today’s political realities make it 
an ideal time to revamp the Economy Act as I suggest. The 
Economy Act was created in the midst of the Great Depression 
to generate governmental efficiencies.21 Congress and the White 
House are more serious about wringing greater efficiencies out 
of agencies today than in any time since the Great Depression.22 
They are looking to save money in nearly all areas of agency 
spending.23 They should look to the interagency marketplace. 
Governmental efficiencies can be gained by broadening agen-
cies’ redelegation powers and allowing agencies to profit from 
the services they provide in the interagency marketplace. And 
these efficiencies can be gained without sacrificing accountabil-
ity or unduly altering the balance of powers among the branch-
es of government. In short, the rules governing the interagency 
marketplace are ripe for efficiency-improving amendments.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the consti-
tutional default rules for the interagency marketplace. Part II 
describes the history of the Economy Act and the legal struc-
ture that it provides for the interagency marketplace. Part III 
proposes several amendments to the Economy Act. The final 
Part concludes. 
I.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULES FOR THE 
INTERAGENCY MARKETPLACE   
The Constitution provides two default rules that control 
the interagency marketplace in the absence of statutory lan-
guage to the contrary: agencies cannot redelegate their authori-
ty or transfer their funds to each other.24 Case law has tended 
to adopt interpretive presumptions against reading ambiguous 
 
 20. See Marisam, supra note 2, at 182–83. 
 21. See REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 12-22 to -26. 
 22. Cf. IAN MILLHISER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, IMPROVING GOVERN-
MENT EFFICIENCY: FEDERAL CONTRACTING REFORM AND OTHER OPERATIONAL 
CHANGES COULD SAVE HUNDREDS OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS 1–2 (2010), avail-
able at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/03/pdf/improving_efficiency 
.pdf (discussing the billions of dollars saved through efficiencies gained 
through recent contracting and procurement reform). 
 23. See, e.g., Huma Khan, As Budget Debates Begin, Republicans Put 
NPR, PBS on Chopping Block, ABC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2011), http://abcnews.go 
.com/Politics/budget-debates-begin-republicans-put-npr-pbs-chopping/story?id= 
12915626. 
 24. See supra notes 6–7. 
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statutes as authorizing interagency redelegation and inter-
agency fund transfers.25 As a result, absent clear and precise 
statutory language to overcome the constitutional default rules 
against interagency redelegations and fund transfers, these ac-
tions are prohibited.26  
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFAULT RULE PROHIBITING THE 
INTERAGENCY REDELEGATION OF AUTHORITY 
Our Constitution vests in Congress the ability to create 
and empower administrative agencies.27 And when, from the 
slew of available agencies, Congress decides to delegate power 
to a particular agency, that agency cannot turn around and 
transfer that power to a different agency unless Congress au-
thorizes it to do so.28 I call this constitutional default rule prohib-
iting interagency redelegation the anti-redelegation doctrine.  
The anti-redelegation doctrine is related to two better-
known doctrines: the far more famous nondelegation doctrine29 
and the somewhat more famous subdelegation doctrine.30 Un-
derstanding these two other doctrines will help illuminate the 
content of the anti-redelegation doctrine. 
 
 25. See, e.g., United States v. Tower & Sons, 14 Ct. Cust. 421, 426 (Ct. 
Cust. App. 1927) (When Congress delegates power to an agency, “for [the 
agency] in turn to redelegate the same is a failure to comply with the mandate 
of the legislature.”). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Again, this power is derived from the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. 
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1183 (1992) (explaining the relationship between the 
Necessary and Proper Clause and the delegation of legislative authority to 
administrative agencies). 
 28. Tower & Sons, 14 Ct. Cust. at 426. 
 29. For analysis of the nondelegation doctrine, see generally Cynthia R. 
Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87 (2010); 
John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 
SUP. CT. REV. 223; Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators 
Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985); Eric A. Pos-
ner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1721 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 
315 (2000). 
 30. For analysis of the subdelegation doctrine, see Thomas W. Merrill, Re-
thinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2175–77 (2004). See generally David J. Barron & Elena 
Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201 (expanding 
on the theory of subdelegation); Nathan D. Grundstein, Subdelegation of Ad-
ministrative Authority, 13 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 144 (1944) (evaluating the 
subdelegation doctrine). 
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All three doctrines are based on the same maxim: delegata 
potetas non potest delegari, or a delegated authority cannot be 
delegated again.31 Under the maxim, a principal can delegate 
authority to an agent, but the agent cannot delegate the same 
authority to anyone else unless authorized by the principal to 
do so.32  
In the case of the nondelegation doctrine, the people of the 
United States are the principal, and Congress is the agent.33 
Through the Constitution, the people have delegated all legisla-
tive authority to Congress,34 and Congress cannot delegate that 
legislative authority to any other entity, such as an executive 
agency.35 The people could authorize Congress to delegate its 
legislative authority, but that would require amending the lan-
guage in the Constitution, which expressly places all legislative 
authority in Congress.36 
In the case of the subdelegation doctrine,37 Congress is the 
principal and a federal agency is the agent.38 After Congress 
delegates authority to that agency or its officials, that authority 
cannot then be subdelegated to a subagency within the agency 
or to lower-level officials within the same agency, unless au-
thorized by Congress.39 The question of whether Congress has 
authorized subdelegation is a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion.40 Most statutes are silent on the matter of subdelegation.41 
 
 31. See Patrick W. Duff & Horace E. Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non 
Potest Delegari: A Maxim of American Constitutional Law, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 
168, 173–76, 190–96 (1928). 
 32. See id. 
 33. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (“[W]e 
long have insisted that ‘the integrity and maintenance of the system of gov-
ernment ordained in the Constitution’ mandate that Congress generally can-
not delegate its legislative power to another Branch.” (quoting Marshall Field 
& Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892))). 
 36. U.S. CONST. art I, § 1. 
 37. For analysis of the doctrine, see David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, 
Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201; Nathan D. 
Grundstein, Subdelegation of Administrative Authority, 13 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 144 (1944); and Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From 
Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2175–77 
(2004). 
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Mango, 199 F.3d 85, 89–91 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See, e.g., National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1, subch. 1 
(2006) (indicating authority for administering the act but silent on matters of 
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The question then becomes whether this silence should be pre-
sumed to express congressional approval or disapproval of 
subdelegation.42 Courts have generally adopted an interpretive 
presumption in favor of subdelegation to a subordinate agen-
cy.43 There are a few cases that have struck down intra-agency 
subdelegations even when there was no express evidence of 
contrary congressional intent.44 But by and large, since the ear-
ly half of the twentieth century, courts have tended to interpret 
congressional silence in favor of intra-agency subdelegation.45 
Thus, for example, the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices is presumptively allowed to subdelegate its authority un-
der the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to the Food and Drug 
Administration, a sub-agency housed within the Department, 
because the authorizing statute is silent on the issue of 
subdelegation.46  
In the case of the anti-redelegation doctrine, Congress is 
again the principal, and the agent is a federal agency. After 
Congress delegates authority to an agency or its officials, that 
authority cannot then be redelegated to another agency or an-
other agency’s officials, unless authorized by Congress.47 The 
question of whether Congress has authorized redelegation is 
again a matter of statutory interpretation.48 And again, most 
 
delegation outside of law enforcement); Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1271–87 (2006) (enumerating the agencies responsible for administering 
the act but completely silent on the issue of delegation). 
 42. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 43. See id. 
 44. See, e.g., Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 183–89 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(invalidating subdelegation from the Department of Transportation to its sub-
agency the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation). 
 45. See, e.g., United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 512–14 (1974) (rul-
ing against intra-agency delegation in the case at hand but noting that, in 
general, it is an “unexceptional” argument to say that “vesting a duty in the 
Attorney General” does not “preclude delegation to other officers in the De-
partment of Justice”); Flemming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 
111, 121–22 (1947); United States v. Mango, 199 F.3d 85, 90–91 (2d Cir. 1999).  
 46. Several sections of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act do forbid dele-
gation. For example, 21 U.S.C. § 350d(b)(7) (2006) prohibits the Secretary of 
the Department of Health and Human Services form delegating to anyone 
other than the Commissioner the authority to suspend registration of food fa-
cilities that violate safety provisions of the Act. The absence of such provisions 
in other areas of the Act implies that delegation to subagencies like the Food 
and Drug Administration is permissible. See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–99 
(2006) ( lacking any such delegation prohibitions).  
 47. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 565. 
 48. See Halverson, 129 F.3d at 183–89. 
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statutes are silent on the matter.49 While courts have generally 
adopted a presumption that interprets statutory silences in fa-
vor of subdelegation, the few cases on point have adopted the 
opposite presumption for redelegation.50 That is, courts have 
read statutory silences as an indication of congressional disap-
proval of interagency redelegation.51 Thus, for example, the De-
partment of Health and Human Services is presumptively 
barred from redelegating its authority under the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act to the Department of Agriculture’s Food Safe-
ty and Inspection Service because the authorizing statute is si-
lent on the issue of interagency redelegation.52  
A series of cases from within the D.C. Circuit offers the 
finest elaboration of the interpretive distinction between intra-
agency subdelegation and interagency redelegation. The court’s 
jurisprudence makes two important analytical moves. First, it 
clearly distinguishes between intra-agency subdelegation and 
redelegation: 
When a statute delegates authority to a federal officer or agency, 
subdelegation to a subordinate federal officer or agency is presump-
tively permissible absent affirmative evidence of a contrary congres-
sional intent. But the cases recognize an important distinction be-
tween subdelegation to a subordinate and [re]delegation to an outside 
party. The presumption that subdelegations are valid absent a show-
ing of contrary congressional intent applies only to the former. There 
is no such presumption covering [re]delegations to outside parties.53 
The second important move in this line of cases is to treat 
redelegation to other agencies in the same manner as redelegation 
to outside parties—thus placing interagency redelegation in the 
category of delegations that are presumptively unauthorized.54 
More precisely, for the purposes of doctrine and interpretive 
 
 49. A smattering of statutes authorize interagency redelegation in specific 
circumstances. See infra notes 322–23.  
 50. See, e.g., Shook v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 
132 F.3d 775, 783–84 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 51. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Pan-Am. Petroleum Co., 6 F.2d 43, 87–
88 (S.D. Cal. 1925), aff ’d in part and rev’d in part, 9 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1926), 
aff ’d, 273 U.S. 456 (1927); cf. ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 
515–17 (1988) (ruling that a history of cooperation between two agencies is not 
worthy of deference when the statutory grant of authorization clearly dele-
gates a duty to only one agency). 
 52. See generally §§ 301–99 (failing to address delegation to the Depart-
ment of Agriculture under broader circumstances).  
 53. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (em-
phasis omitted) (citations omitted). 
 54. See id. at 565–68; Shook, 132 F.3d at 783–84; Nat’l Park & Conserva-
tion Ass’n v. Stanton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 7, 19–21 (D.D.C. 1999). 
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presumptions, the cases do not distinguish among three differ-
ent types of redelegation: (1) redelegation from one agency to 
another agency at the same level of government in our federal 
system;55 (2) redelegation from a federal agency to a state agen-
cy;56 and (3) redelegation from an agency to a private entity.57 
The courts applied the presumption against redelegation equal-
ly to all three types of redelegation.58 
The lumping together of these different types of 
redelegation is seen most directly in the case of Shook v. Dis-
trict of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management 
Assistance Authority.59 The case involved the transfer of author-
ity between the D.C. Control Board and the Board of Trustees.60 
These two local Washington agencies operate under the control 
of Congress, which has plenary authority over D.C., and had 
established the Control Board to oversee D.C. agencies’ admin-
istrative practices.61 However, the Control Board redelegated 
some of its oversight duties—in particular those concerning 
oversight of the D.C. education system—to the Board of Trus-
tees.62 The relevant congressional statutes were silent on the 
Control Board’s authority to redelegate its broad oversight du-
ties to another agency.63 The D.C. Circuit interpreted this si-
lence as prohibiting the redelegation, stating that “[a]lthough 
the Control Board may have its own delegation powers that 
could be used to subdelegate to one of its own members or 
staff . . . we still do not think that the Control Board can 
redelegate its [statutory] power to an outside body.”64 The court 
further noted that the Circuit has: “often . . . upheld an agency 
head’s ability to delegate duties to subordinate officers, but 
[that] these cases do not involve delegations of agency authority 
to outside parties.”65  
Tellingly, the court referred to the Board of Trustees as an 
 
 55. For example, redelegation from one federal cabinet department to an-
other. See Shook, 132 F.3d at 783–84. 
 56. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 565–68. 
 57. See Stanton, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 19–21. 
 58. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 565–68; Shook, 132 F.3d at 783–
84; Stanton, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 19–21. 
 59. 132 F.3d 775. 
 60. Id. at 775–76. 
 61. See id. at 776–78. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. at 783–84 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
 65. Id. at 784 n.6. 
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“outside body” and an “outside part[y].”66 It did not matter to 
the court that this outside body was an agency at the same lev-
el of government as the Control Board.67 The court applied the 
same interpretive presumption that the D.C. Circuit and the 
District Court for D.C. would later apply to redelegation from a 
federal agency to private actors68 and redelegation from a fed-
eral agency to a state agency.69 In all these cases, redelegation 
was presumptively unauthorized.  
The Supreme Court’s clearest articulation of the anti-
redelegation doctrine came in ETSI Pipeline Project v. Mis-
souri.70 In that case, Congress had delegated oversight of a Mis-
souri River reservoir to the Department of the Army.71 The gov-
erning statute was silent on the issue of interagency 
redelegation.72 Nevertheless, the Army Department and the 
Department of the Interior (Interior) entered into an agreement 
that appeared to redelegate authority from the Army to Interi-
or.73 The agreement authorized the Secretary of the Interior, 
“as agent for the Secretary of the Army, [to] contract for the 
marketing of water for industrial uses” from the reservoir.74 In-
terior later entered into such a contract, and the contract’s  
validity was challenged in court.75 The Supreme Court held that 
Interior did not have independent authority to enter into the 
contract and that the Army could not redelegate its contracting 
authority to Interior, because “the Executive Branch is not 
permitted to administer the [delegating statute] in a manner 
that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that 
Congress enacted into law.”76 The Supreme Court’s statement 
presumes that Congress’s silence on interagency redelegation 
meant that Congress did not want to allow the agencies to alter 
the administrative structure through redelegation. As a result, 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See Nat’l Park & Conservation Ass’n v. Stanton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 7, 19–
21 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 69. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565–66 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(“There is no such presumption [of validity] covering subdelegations to outside 
parties . . . . The fact that the subdelegation in this case is to state commis-
sions rather than private organizations does not alter the analysis.”). 
 70. 484 U.S. 495 (1988). 
 71. Id. at 505. 
 72. Id. at 506. 
 73. Id. at 516. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 517. 
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without express authorization from Congress, the Army could 
not redelegate its contracting authority to Interior.77 
The presumption against interagency redelegation applies 
even when the President approves of or directs the 
redelegation.78 If Congress delegates authority directly to the 
President, then the President has the power to subdelegate 
that authority to an agency of his choosing.79 But when Con-
gress names a specific agency to act and does not otherwise au-
thorize redelegation, then the President has no power to au-
thorize an interagency redelegation.80 For example, in a 1921 
executive order, President Harding transferred from the Navy 
Department to Interior the authority to develop naval petrole-
um reserves.81 However, the executive order was held unconsti-
tutional because the President cannot “transfer from one mem-
ber of his Cabinet to another member of his Cabinet powers 
and duties that had been conferred by the Congress on a speci-
fied Cabinet officer . . . .”82  
In short, courts have generally adopted a presumption in 
favor of intra-agency subdelegation.83 Thus, in the absence of 
clear congressional language to the contrary, high-level agency 
officials can usually subdelegate authority to lower level offi-
cials or subagencies within the agency.84 However, courts have 
adopted the opposite presumption for redelegation to outside 
parties, including redelegation to other agencies at the same 
level of government.85 Thus, in the absence of clear congres-
sional language, interagency redelegation is presumptively 
barred.86  
 
 77. Id. 
 78. See, e.g., United States v. Pan-Am. Petroleum Co., 6 F.2d 43, 87 (S.D. 
Cal. 1925). 
 79. Presidential subdelegation powers were originally established by con-
stitutional common law. See Wolsey v. Chapman, 101 U.S. 755, 769 (1879); 
United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 291, 301–02 (1842); Wilcox v. Jack-
son, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 513 (1839). Congress later codified these powers in 
the Presidential Subdelegation Act of 1950, 3 U.S.C. §§ 301–03 (2006); see also 
Marisam, supra note 2, at 231–36 (analyzing the benefits and costs in accord-
ing the President such an authority).  
 80. See 3 U.S.C. §§ 301–03. 
 81. Pan-Am. Petroleum Co., 6 F.2d at 50. 
 82. Id. at 87. 
 83. See Shook v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 132 
F.3d 775, 783–84 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See, e.g., ETSI Pipeline Project v. Hodel, 484 U.S. 495, 517 (1988). 
 86. See id. 
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B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFAULT RULE PROHIBITING 
INTERAGENCY FUND TRANSFERS 
The Appropriations Clause of the Constitution provides 
that: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Con-
sequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”87 The clause is 
considered one of the most important constitutional checks on 
executive power.88 It prevents the President and executive 
agencies from using money in any way that is not specifically 
authorized by Congress.89 Applied to the interagency market-
place, this constitutional rule has one simple but powerful ef-
fect: “[a]gencies are prohibited from transferring funds [among 
themselves] absent statutory authority.”90  
Whether Congress has authorized an agency to transfer 
funds to another agency is a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion.91 The interpretations here are usually not handed down by 
federal courts, but by the Comptroller General, whom Congress 
has placed in charge of interpreting and applying appropria-
tions law.92 The Comptroller General has taken a narrow view 
 
 87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 88. OPM v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427 (1990) (“The power to control 
and direct the appropriations, constitutes a most useful and salutary check 
upon profusion and extravagance, as well as upon corrupt influence and public 
speculation . . . .” (quoting 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 1348 (3d ed. 1858))). 
 89. See id. at 428. 
 90. Denali Comm’n, B-319189, 2010 WL 4631284 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 12, 
2010); see also 17 Comp. Gen. 174 (1910) (requiring explicit statutory authori-
ty for transferring funds in such a manner); Air Force Office of Scientific Re-
search, B-301561, 2004 WL 1853465 (Comp. Gen. June 14, 2004) (“Unless oth-
erwise authorized by law, transfers of funds between federal agencies and 
instrumentalities are prohibited by law.”). This constitutional rule has also 
been codified in 31 U.S.C. § 1532 (2006) (“An amount available under law may 
be withdrawn from one appropriation account and credited to another or to a 
working fund only when authorized by law.”).  
 91. See Edward R. Murray, Note, Beyond Bowsher: The Comptroller Gen-
eral’s Account Settlement Authority and Separation of Powers, 68 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 161, 162 (1999) (describing the Comptroller General’s authority to in-
terpret “what types of government expenses are allowable”). 
 92. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 712(1), 717, 719(c), 3511, 3526(a) (charging the 
Comptroller General with several duties, including investigating all matters 
related to the use of public funds, evaluating federal programs, reporting to 
Congress on audits and illegal uses of public money, prescribing the account-
ing standards for each executive agency head, and settling the accounts of the 
government). It is an open question whether these opinions are binding on the 
executive, as the Comptroller General asserts, or merely advisory. Compare 
Murray, supra note 91, at 165 (deciding “[t]hese authorities are most likely 
unconstitutional in light of [Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)]”), with 
REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 1-27 (“A decision regarding an account of the gov-
 2012] INTERAGENCY MARKETPLACE 899 
 
in determining whether Congress has authorized interagency 
fund transfers. For the most part, it requires one of several 
statutory phrases to overcome the constitutional presumption 
against interagency transfers. These phrases include language 
stating that an agency can transfer funds to another agency,93 
reimburse another agency,94 or contract with another agency.95 
Without these specific phrases or similar ones, the Comptroller 
General is unlikely to find that Congress has authorized inter-
agency fund transfers.96 For example, in one case involving an 
agreement between the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and the Department of the Interior, the Comptroller 
General disallowed a transfer that the agencies said advanced 
the general “purposes” of the EPA’s authorizing statutes but 
was not specifically authorized in the statutes.97  
Although a fairly straightforward doctrine, the rule against 
interagency transfers can have harsh results. In one case, the 
Bureau of Standards (Bureau), a subagency of the Department 
of Commerce, had discovered a chemical that could act as an 
air purifier—a finding of particular interest to the Department 
of the Navy because of the chemical’s potential benefits for air 
in submarines.98 The Navy did not have adequate science labs 
of its own to study the chemical, and so the Navy wanted to 
fund further research by the Bureau.99 At the time, the Navy 
had statutory authority to transfer funds to buy military 
equipment from other military agencies.100 But, the Comptroller 
General held that this statutory authority did not cover scien-
tific research.101 Thus, the Navy could not pay the Bureau to re-
search how the chemical could aid in submarine air purifica-
tion. Because the Bureau did not have adequate funds of its 
own to perform the kind of research the Navy wanted, the re-
search could not be performed.102 The constitutional rule 
against interagency transfers effectively stifled valuable scien-
 
ernment is binding on the executive branch . . . .”). 
 93. Library of Cong., B-302760, 2004 WL 1146276. 
 94. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., B-167790, 1977 WL 12105. 
 95. Dep’t of Energy, B-193005, 1978 WL 11174. 
 96. See, e.g., Dep’t of the Interior, Office of Water Research & Tech., B-
197344, 1980 WL 16095 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 21, 1980). 
 97. Id. 
 98. 7 Comp. Gen. 524, 524–25 (1928). 
 99. Id. at 525. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 526. 
 102. Id. at 525. 
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tific research and development. Overall, without clear and ex-
press statutory language, the Constitution establishes that 
agencies cannot redelegate authority or transfer funds to each 
other, and the Comptroller General has been unyielding in up-
holding this principle.103 
II.  THE ECONOMY ACT OF 1932   
The only comprehensive statute regulating the interagency 
marketplace is the Economy Act of 1932.104 Other statutes per-
mit specific agencies to obtain specific services from other 
agencies,105 but the Economy Act is the only statute that covers 
all government agencies—whether cabinet departments, inde-
pendent agencies, or temporary government commissions and 
councils—and all types of government services.106 Indeed, Econ-
omy Act agreements have been used for a wide array of ser-
vices, such as providing personnel details, data analyses, in-
spections or oversight of regulated entities, scientific research 
and development, staff training, government procurements, re-
al property leases, personal property maintenance work, and 
more.107 In this Article, I adopt the language of the Redbook108 
and refer to the agency that transfers the money as the order-
ing agency and the agency that receives the money and pro-
vides the services as the performing agency.109  
Congress passed the Economy Act during the Great De-
pression to improve governmental efficiencies.110 The Act allows 
an agency to save money by hiring another agency to provide a 
service more efficiently than it can.111 Moreover, by allowing 
agencies to provide services for each other, it prevents agencies 
from wasting resources by building up expertise and infrastruc-
ture that duplicate other agencies’ existing expertise and infra-
structure.  
 
 103. See, e.g., Denali Comm’n, B-319189, 2010 WL 4631284 (Comp. Gen. 
Nov. 12, 2010). 
 104. See 31 U.S.C. § 1535 (2006). 
 105. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4101(a) (2006) (authorizing the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development to reimburse federal agencies such as the 
Army Corps of Engineers for flood management services). 
 106. See REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 12-31 to -33. 
 107. See id. at 12-54 to -68. 
 108. Id. at 12-22 to -76. 
 109. See, e.g., id. at 12-31. 
 110. See id. at 12-22. 
 111. See 31 U.S.C. § 1535(a) (2006) (stating that interagency agreements 
for goods or services are permissible in certain circumstances). 
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However, the Economy Act does not free agencies to enter 
into any transaction they like.112 The Act places significant re-
strictions on the interagency marketplace.113 Most importantly, 
the Act does not expressly authorize interagency redelegations 
and thus does not on its face overcome the constitutional de-
fault rule against redelegation.114 Nevertheless, the Comptroller 
General has allowed some redelegation, so long as the ordering 
agency retains control over the redelegated tasks and the tasks 
do not involve significant decision-making authority or an 
agency’s primary administrative functions.115  
As for interagency fund transfers, the Act expressly au-
thorizes them and thus overcomes the constitutional default 
rule against them.116 However, the Act places several re-
strictions on how and how much money can be transferred.117 
Most importantly, it prevents performing agencies from profit-
ing by charging ordering agencies more than the actual cost of 
their services.118  
Despite the Economy Act’s substantive restrictions on in-
teragency agreements, the Act places few procedural re-
strictions on agencies.119 The Comptroller General reviews only 
a fraction of all Economy Act agreements.120 Moreover, Econo-
my Act agreements are not subject to the fundamental admin-
istrative procedures established under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.121 With such spotty oversight of Economy Act 
agreements, it is difficult to ensure that agencies actually com-
ply with the substantive rules established under the Act. 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. § 1535 (failing to mention interagency redelegations as facets of 
allowable interagency agreements). 
 115. See infra Part II.B. 
 116. See infra Part II.B. 
 117. See infra Part II.C. 
 118. REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 12-36 to -37 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 1536(b) as 
demonstrative of “the Economy Act’s approach of structuring the transaction 
so that the performing agency neither profits nor is penalized”). 
 119. See John Cibinic, Jr. & Jesse E. Lasken, The Comptroller General and 
Government Contracts, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 349, 349–52 (1970) (identifying 
review by the Comptroller General as the primary tool for gauging acceptabil-
ity of transactions). 
 120. See Interdepartmental Work: on H.R. 10199 Before the Comm. on Ex-
penditures in the Exec. Dep’ts, 71st Cong. 3, 32 (1930) [hereinafter Hearings] 
(discussing a conscious effort to review a limited number of agreements in the 
interest of efficiency and timeliness). 
 121. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2006). 
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This Part proceeds as follows. In Section A, I examine the 
history behind the Economy Act. I draw attention to the history 
because the trends that pushed Congress to enact the Economy 
Act are present again today and could spur Congress to revisit 
and improve the law. In Sections B and C, I discuss the Act’s 
legal rules and constraints for the interagency redelegation of 
authority and interagency transfer of funds. In Section D, I con-
sider the procedural constraints on Economy Act agreements.  
A. THE HISTORY OF THE ECONOMY ACT 
In the early twentieth century, the interagency market-
place was barren.122 There were very few statutes that author-
ized agencies to pay other agencies for their services, and those 
statutes that did exist were quite limited in scope and applica-
tion.123 For example, the Navy was often given authority in the 
annual appropriations bill to buy military equipment from oth-
er branches of the military.124 But broad authorizations for in-
teragency exchanges were nonexistent.125 On top of these legal 
constraints, there was a bureaucratic norm against interagency 
exchanges.126 Public officials at the time were uncomfortable 
with government contracting, and agencies operated in relative 
independence from one another.127  
Two trends helped break down the legal and bureaucratic 
barriers to a robust interagency marketplace. First, the com-
plexity of government multiplied exponentially in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries.128 The industrial revolu-
tion, westward expansion, the growth of interstate commerce, 
and a surge in energy demands generated new and complex 
regulatory problems.129 A slew of agencies were created to tack-
le these problems—agencies such as the Department of Com-
merce and Labor,130 the Interstate Commerce Commission,131 
 
 122. See REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 12-22; see also A. H. Erck, Standardi-
zation of Purchase Procedure for the Federal Government, 137 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 199, 199 (1928) (noting that until the 1920s the “vari-
ous departments operated practically independently of each other”). 
 123. See, e.g., Act of May 21, 1926, ch. 355, 44 Stat. 591, 605 (1935). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Erck, supra note 122. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 12–23 (“[T]here was discomfort with 
the concept of the government contracting with itself.”). 
 128. See infra notes 130–40. 
 129. See infra notes 130–40. 
 130. See HELEN BOWERS, FROM LIGHTHOUSES TO LASERBEAMS: A HISTORY 
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the Federal Trade Commission,132 the Food and Drug Admin-
istration,133 the U.S. Geological Survey,134 the Bureau of Recla-
mation,135 and the Bureau of Mines.136 With more agencies ad-
dressing increasingly complex and overlapping regulatory 
problems, it became increasingly beneficial for agencies to in-
teract and rely on each other. Hiring other agencies to perform 
tasks was one way that an agency could tap into other agencies’ 
experience and expertise handling complex regulatory prob-
lems.137  
Second, in the early twentieth century, federal spending 
exploded and the federal debt ballooned.138 In 1917, the debt 
was under $6 billion.139 Fifteen years later, when the Economy 
Act was passed, the debt was over $19 billion.140 The massive 
deficit spending put enormous pressure on political actors to 
make government more efficient.141 Removing some of the bar-
 
OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 1913–1988, at 6–7 (1988) (describing 
how “the enormous growth of business, industry, commerce and banking be-
tween 1850 and 1900” and “the nation’s rapid change from an agrarian society 
to an industrial one” helped inspire the department’s creation). 
 131. See Rene Sacasas, The Filed Tariff Doctrine: Casualty or Survivor of 
Deregulation?, 29 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (1990) (detailing how Congress created 
the Interstate Commerce Commission after years of complaints regarding the 
indiscretions of the railroad industry). 
 132. See John B. Daish, The Federal Trade Commission, 24 YALE L.J. 43, 
43–44 (1914). 
 133. See Centennial of FDA, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Centennialof 
FDA/default.htm ( last visited Dec. 6, 2011) (calling the creation of the FDA “a 
hallmark of the Progressive Era” that spurred “widespread consumer protec-
tion in the U.S.”). 
 134. See Act of Mar. 3, 1879, ch. 182, § 1, 20 Stat. 394 (1962) (codified as 
amended at 43 U.S.C. § 31(a) (2006)) (creating the Geological Survey and task-
ing its director with “the classification of the public lands and examination of 
the Geological Structure, mineral resources, and products of the national do-
main”). 
 135. See History of Interior, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.doi.gov/ 
whoweare/history.cfm ( last visited Dec. 6, 2011) (noting the Bureau of Recla-
mation was “established to construct dams and aqueducts in the west”). 
 136. See id. (citing mine safety and minerals technology as the impetus for 
the Bureau’s creation). 
 137. See REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 12-31. 
 138. See Historical Debt Outstanding—Annual 1900–1950, DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt_histo3 
.htm ( last visited Dec. 6, 2011) (outlining historical trends in federal debt). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 12-22 (suggesting that government ac-
ceptance of interagency agreements stemmed, at least in part, from adverse 
economic conditions). 
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riers to interagency exchanges was one way that Congress 
could help improve governmental efficiencies.142 
In 1920, Congress passed a short provision allowing agen-
cies to provide goods or perform services for other agencies.143 
However, the law ended up doing little to invigorate the inter-
agency marketplace, partly because of narrow statutory inter-
pretations.144 The Comptroller General held that the 1920 law 
only authorized the “performance of specific pieces of work such 
as ordinarily would be for accomplishing by means of a contract 
with a commercial contractor.”145 Thus, the kinds of tasks per-
formed under the law were generally limited to the purchasing 
or loaning of goods and the commission of studies.  
The law’s own restrictive language was also a problem. The 
law did not authorize full reimbursement of agencies’ costs, but 
instead limited reimbursement to costs from “direct expendi-
ture” only.146 In practice, this rule meant that one agency could 
pay another agency for the paper it used to prepare a study, but 
it could not pay for the salaries of that agency’s employees to 
cover the time spent preparing the study.147 Similarly, an agen-
cy could not seek reimbursement for loaning out its equipment 
or facilities to another agency.148 The loaning agency had to ab-
sorb all the costs of wear and tear and overhead itself.149  
In general, under the 1920 law, an agency could not recoup 
the full costs of providing services for other agencies.150 Thus, 
exchanges in the interagency marketplace depended on the 
willingness of one agency to tap into its own coffers in order to 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. That whenever any Government bureau or department procures, by 
purchase or manufacture, stores or materials of any kind, or performs any 
service for another bureau or department, the funds of the bureau or depart-
ment for which the stores or materials are to be procured or the service per-
formed may be placed subject to the requisitions of the bureau or department 
making the procurement or performing the service for direct expenditure . . . .”). 
 144. See, e.g., 5 Comp. Gen. 757, 758 (1926). 
 145. Id. 
 146. § 7, 41 Stat. at 613. 
 147. See REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 12–22 n.11; see also Sec’y of War, A-
33694, 1930 WL 1184 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 1, 1930) (requiring appropriation 
funds to be applied only to the direct object that was approved); Sec’y of the 
Interior, A-27111, 1929 WL 1264 (Comp. Gen. May 11, 1929) (disallowing 
payment for depreciation on “passenger-carrying vehicles used in . . . coopera-
tive work”). 
 148. Sec’y of War, A-33694, 1930 WL 1184. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See § 7, 41 Stat. at 607. 
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do a favor for another agency.151  
Within a decade of the 1920 law’s enactment, the Great 
Depression was in full swing.152 The pressure on lawmakers to 
find greater governmental efficiencies ramped up.153 In this en-
vironment, Congress decided to revisit the 1920 law. The result 
was the Economy Act of 1932, which gave broader authority for 
interagency exchanges and for the first time allowed agencies 
to be fully reimbursed for their interagency services.154  
In its committee report, the House Committee on the Ex-
penditures in the Executive Department emphasized the effi-
ciency gains that would come from passing a law designed to 
encourage more interagency transactions:  
[V]ery substantial economies can be realized by one department avail-
ing itself of the equipment and services of another department in 
proper cases. A free interchange of work as contemplated by this bill 
will enable all bureaus and activities of the Government to be utilized 
to their fullest and in many cases make it unnecessary for departments 
to set up duplicating and overlapping activities on [their] own.155 
The idea here is twofold. First, allowing agencies access to 
the personnel and property of other agencies can save money by 
avoiding the unnecessary duplication of expertise and infra-
structure in different agencies. Second, allowing an ordering 
agency to hire a performing agency can save money if the per-
forming agency can do the job more efficiently than the order-
ing agency could. 
In the end, the emphasis on economics was effective, and 
the Act passed as part of a package of measures designed to re-
duce government spending.156 The Comptroller General was put 
in charge of giving agencies and legislators advice about the le-
gality of interagency transactions under the law.157  
 
 151. See id. 
 152. See, e.g., The Great Depression, AM. EXPERIENCE, http://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/dustbowl-great-depression / 
( last visited Dec. 6, 2011). 
 153. See id. 
 154. See 31 U.S.C. § 1535 (2006). 
 155. Wash. Nat’l Airport, B-136318, 1978 WL 13460 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 14, 
1978) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 71-2201, at 2–3 (1931)). 
 156. See REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 12–22. 
 157. This authority was implicit in the Office’s general authority to oversee 
appropriations law. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 712(1), 719(c), 3526(a). 
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B. THE ECONOMY ACT AND THE INTERAGENCY REDELEGATION 
OF AUTHORITY  
Interagency redelegation is not mentioned in the Economy 
Act.158 The Comptroller General initially interpreted this si-
lence to mean that the Act did not provide the statutory author-
ity needed to overcome the constitutional default rule against 
interagency redelegation.159 However, over time the Comptrol-
ler General, while still claiming to adhere to the interpretation 
that the Economy Act does not authorize interagency 
redelegations, has issued opinions approving of Economy Act 
agreements that redelegate authority from one agency to an-
other.160 These redelegations survive Comptroller General re-
view largely because the Comptroller General has adopted a le-
gal test that permits apparent redelegations so long as the 
ordering agency retains “ultimate responsibility” for the 
redelegated tasks.161 But despite this porous legal test, the 
Comptroller General has not opened the door for any and all 
redelegations.162 The Comptroller General continues to prohibit 
the redelegation of an agency’s primary administrative func-
tions and the redelegation of significant decision-making au-
thority, such as the authority to draft binding rules or to levy 
fines on regulated entities.163 In general, the more significant 
and central to an agency’s core mission, the less likely that 
regulatory powers can be redelegated under the Economy Act.  
In legislative hearings on the Economy Act, one legislator 
is quoted stating that it is “impossible under this bill . . . for one 
department to delegate its functions to another.”164 Comptroller 
General interpretations of the Economy Act have long claimed 
to accord with this statement.165 Early interpretations held that 
an Economy Act agreement “does not vest in the service-
 
 158. See id. § 1535 (omitting any reference to such redelegation). 
 159. 18 Comp. Gen. 262, 266 (1938). 
 160. See, e.g., Dir., AMFD, B-200309, 1981 WL 24197 (Comp. Gen. Apr. 3, 
1981). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See, e.g., B-120281 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 25, 1958), available at http:// 
redbook.gao.gov/6/fl0027891.php (providing an example of how the Comptrol-
ler General specifies particularized circumstances in which redelegation is au-
thorized). 
 163. See, e.g., B-163758, 1971 WL 7556 (Comp. Gen. May 6, 1971) (specify-
ing that, “authority is granted to the head of a department, agency, or other 
establishment to redelegate to such official or officials as he may designate 
within his organization,” not to another organization). 
 164. Hearings, supra note 120, at 6. 
 165. See, e.g., 18 Comp. Gen. 262, 266 (1938). 
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rendering agency any authority which it does not have inde-
pendently.”166 Thus, in principle, a performing agency can only 
perform a task if it is authorized by Congress to perform that 
task on its own—an ordering agency cannot authorize a per-
forming agency to do a job that the performing agency cannot 
otherwise do itself.  
The rationale behind this reading of the Economy Act is 
rooted in constitutional norms. As the Comptroller General ex-
plained: 
The [constitutional] theory . . . is that there is inherent in a grant of 
authority to a department or agency to perform a certain function, 
and to expend public funds in connection therewith, a responsibility 
which, having been reposed specifically in such department or agency 
by the Congress, may not be transferred except by specific action of 
the Congress.167 
In practice, many—if not most—Economy Act agreements 
abide by this prohibition on interagency redelegation. For ex-
ample, agencies routinely loan or lease property to each other, 
property that each agency is at least impliedly authorized to 
use to do its job.168 Similarly, agencies have routinely followed 
the longstanding practice of procuring office supplies such as 
computers for each other, supplies that each agency is clearly 
allowed to use to administer its duties.169 Moreover, agencies 
routinely compile or analyze data for each other, services that 
are generally permissible under agencies’ broad powers to col-
lect and analyze information.170  
However, some Economy Act agreements are not in line 
with a strict application of the prohibition on interagency 
redelegation of authority. These agreements have survived 
Comptroller General review because of the porous legal test 
that the Comptroller General uses to determine whether there 
has been an impermissible redelegation.171 The test, first laid 
out in a 1944 case, permits the apparent redelegation of author-
ity to perform tasks so long as the ordering agency retains ul-
timate responsibility or control over the tasks.172 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 12-71 (quoting B-45488 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 
11, 1944)). 
 168. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 24 Comp. Gen. 184 (1944). 
 169. Sec’y of State, A-48145, 1933 WL 782 (Comp. Gen. Apr. 18, 1933). 
 170. Sec’y of Commerce, 14 Comp. Gen. 923 (1935). 
 171. See B-45488 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 11, 1944) (on file with Government Ac-
countability Office). 
 172. REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 12-71 to -72; see B-45488 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 
11, 1944) (on file with Government Accountability Office). 
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Under this test, the Comptroller General has routinely up-
held the redelegation of authority to perform relatively minor 
administrative functions, such as the disbursing of funds.173 For 
example, the Comptroller General upheld an Economy Act 
agreement through which the Civil Service Commission al-
lowed the Department of the Army to access and disburse mon-
ey from a disability fund.174 It is difficult to argue that there 
was not some redelegation of authority under this arrange-
ment. Congress placed the Commission in control of the funds, 
and the Commission in turn authorized the Army to access the 
funds.175 Congress never authorized the Army to access the 
funds.176 The Army’s sole authority to do so came from the 
Commission.177 Nevertheless, the Comptroller General held 
that this arrangement was permissible because the Commis-
sion planned to audit the Army’s decision, and thus “responsi-
bility for the performance of the function generally would re-
main” with the Commission.178 
In another case involving the redelegation of authority to 
disburse funds, Congress had statutorily transferred the au-
thority to run certain overseas schools from the Department of 
Defense to the Department of Education.179 Despite the transfer 
of authority, the two agencies wanted to enter into an Economy 
Act agreement that would authorize the Department of Defense 
to continue to provide financial services for the schools, such as 
disbursing payments to the schools’ employees and certifying 
vouchers for payments.180 In effect, the Department of Educa-
tion wanted to redelegate back to the Department of Defense 
some of the authority that Congress had just transferred from 
Defense to Education.181 Despite the apparent interagency 
redelegation, the Comptroller General approved the agreement 
so long as Education “retain[ed] responsibility for the adminis-
trative function” by auditing and accounting for Defense’s use 
 
 173. See Job Corps Ctr. Receipts, 65 Comp. Gen. 666 (1986); Dir., AFMD, 
Comp. Gen. B-200309, 1981 WL 24197 (Comp. Gen. Apr. 3, 1981); Comp. Gen. 
B-45488 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 11, 1944) (on file with Government Accountability 
Office); see also REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 12-71 to -72. 
 174. See REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 12-71 to -72. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Dir., AFMD, B-200309, 1981 WL 24197 (Comp. Gen. Apr. 3, 1981). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
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of the funds.182 
While the Comptroller General’s holdings allow for some 
limited redelegation of agency authority, they do not afford 
agencies complete freedom to redelegate as they see fit. The 
case law has only allowed de facto redelegation of mundane 
administrative functions, such as the disbursing of funds when 
the ordering agency retained ultimate responsibility. The 
Comptroller General has never upheld Economy Act agree-
ments that involve the redelegation of more potent powers, 
such as the authority to publish binding rules or punish regu-
lated entities with fines. 
Indeed, the Comptroller General has made clear that 
agreements redelegating an agency’s primary administrative 
functions or redelegating significant decision-making authority 
are impermissible, regardless whether the ordering agency re-
tains ultimate responsibility.183 For example, the Comptroller 
General held that the Public Health Service cannot redelegate 
its authority to provide health care to merchant seamen be-
cause such services are a primary function of the agency and 
the Economy Act “certainly was not intended to be a basis for 
transferring a primary administrative function from an agent 
in which it is vested by Congress.”184 Similarly, the Comptroller 
General has stated that an agency can redelegate the authority 
to collect debts owed to a government agency, but an agency 
cannot redelegate the more significant authority for “the taking 
of final compromise or termination action” against debtors.185  
In sum, the Economy Act does not expressly authorize in-
teragency redelegations and thus appears not to override the 
constitutional default rule against redelegation.186 However, the 
Comptroller General permits some redelegation to go forward 
de facto, so long as the ordering agency retains responsibility 
for the redelegated tasks and the tasks do not involve signifi-
cant decision-making authority or an agency’s primary admin-
istrative functions.187  
 
 182. Id. 
 183. See, e.g., Chairman Edward A. Garmatz, H. Comm. on Merch. Marine 
& Fisheries, B-156510 (Comp. Gen. Feb. 23, 1971), available at http://redbook 
.gao.gov/2/fl0006984.php. 
 184. Id. 
 185. REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 12-71. 
 186. See id. 
 187. B-163758, 1971 WL 7556 (Comp. Gen. May 6, 1971). 
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C. THE ECONOMY ACT AND INTERAGENCY FUND TRANSFERS 
The Economy Act states that agencies may transfer funds 
in exchange for services,188 and thus provides the express statu-
tory authority needed to overcome the constitutional default 
rule against fund transfers. However, the Act does not author-
ize a system of free exchanges within the interagency market-
place.189 To prevent agencies from using fund transfers to cir-
cumvent congressional controls on agencies’ budgets and 
spending powers, the Act places significant constraints on how 
and how much funds can be transferred among agencies.190 In 
this Section, I discuss the three most important Economy Act 
restrictions on interagency fund transfers—what I will refer to 
as the actual cost rule, the deobligation rule, and the lower-cost 
rule.  
1. The Actual Cost Rule 
The Economy Act requires that an ordering agency reim-
burse a performing agency for the full or “actual cost” of its ser-
vices.191 The ordering agency cannot pay the performing agency 
anything more or anything less than the actual cost of the ser-
vices provided.192 The rule has two key effects: the performing 
agency cannot profit from services provided under the Economy 
Act, and the performing agency cannot receive nonmonetary 
consideration in lieu of some or all of the agency’s actual 
costs.193  
The actual cost rule was apparently designed, in part, to 
reverse the line of cases under the 1920 law that barred reim-
bursement for salaries, overhead, and wear and tear. By man-
dating that ordering agencies reimburse performing agencies 
for the full costs of their services,194 the actual cost rule ensures 
that performing agencies do not need to dip into their own cof-
fers to provide services for other agencies, as they had to do 
prior to the Economy Act. Thus, the rule lifted a significant fi-
nancial disincentive to offering services in the interagency 
marketplace.  
The actual cost rule is also supposed to preserve Congress’s 
 
 188. 31 U.S.C. § 1535(a) (2006). 
 189. See id. § 1535. 
 190. See id. 
 191. Id. § 1535(b). 
 192. Id. 
 193. See id. 
 194. Id. 
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ability to control the size of agencies’ budgets. Congress’s power 
to control agency spending is one of the most important checks 
that the legislature has on the Executive.195 Congress sets 
agencies’ budgets each year.196 If agencies need extra money for 
a program, they must submit a supplementary budget request 
to Congress.197 Thus, because agencies are completely reliant on 
Congress for their funds, Congress can ensure that agencies’ 
spending priorities do not diverge too much from congressional 
priorities.198 Moreover, Congress can use its budgetary powers 
to discipline agency behavior—rewarding agencies that gener-
ally behave in line with congressional expectations by appro-
priating them more money or punishing poorly behaved agen-
cies by slashing their funding.199  
The actual cost rule prevents agencies from using the in-
teragency marketplace in ways that weaken this congressional 
check on executive agency behavior. Because of the actual cost 
rule, a performing agency cannot charge more for its services 
than its actual costs—that is, it cannot profit from its ser-
vices.200 This ban on profits prevents performing agencies from 
using Economy Act agreements to augment their budgets be-
yond the limits intended by Congress. At the same time, the 
rule is supposed to ensure that ordering agencies cannot aug-
ment their budgets by receiving free or discounted services 
from performing agencies. The receipt of free or discounted ser-
vices could let an ordering agency redistribute the money it 
otherwise would have to spend on those services to a different 
set of services, thus in effect augmenting the funds available 
for those other services.  
From an accounting perspective, the actual cost rule is 
loosely enforced. The Economy Act does not define “actual cost,” 
so the precise contours have been outlined piecemeal by the 
Comptroller General. Under the case law, an agency perform-
ing services for an ordering agency must be reimbursed for the 
 
 195. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 19, at 298. 
 196. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. 
L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 
U.S.C.) (codifying Congress’s budget authority and the requirement that, each 
year, Congress develops a “budget resolution” in order to set agencies’ budgets). 
 197. See, e.g., Jerry Brito & Veronique de Rugy, Midnight Regulations and 
Regulatory Review, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 178 (2009).  
 198. Id. 
 199. See Marisam, supra note 2. 
 200. 31 U.S.C. § 1535(b) (2006). 
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salary of the employees engaged in the work,201 the costs of ma-
terials or equipment used,202 transportation costs,203 and over-
head such as costs from administrative supervision and rent for 
office space.204 However, the Economy Act does not require a 
precise accounting of the actual costs. It is enough that the 
agencies agree on a reimbursement that is based on a “bona 
fide attempt to determine the actual cost and, in fact, reasona-
bly approximates the actual cost.”205 The reason for such a flex-
ible accounting requirement is that the Act is meant to foster 
interagency coordination and cooperation, not interagency 
bickering over bills.206 
Despite the relatively lax accounting standard, the actual 
cost rule is quite restrictive in other ways. Most importantly, 
there are no exceptions to the prohibition on profits.207 In one 
case, the Water Resources Council hired the Bureau of Land 
Management to conduct a water resources study on its behalf.208 
The Council advanced the Bureau several hundred thousand 
dollars for its services.209 However, the Bureau only had to use 
about half of the advanced sum for the study.210 The Bureau 
asked the Comptroller General for advice on whether by law 
the Bureau could use the remaining money for similar water-
related studies.211 The answer was no.212 The Comptroller Gen-
eral held that the Bureau had to return the unused portion of 
the advanced funds because “any retention of amounts in ex-
cess of actual costs for the study called for in the [interagency 
agreement] would result in an improper augmentation of [the 
Bureau’s] appropriations.”213  
 
 201. See, e.g., Architect of the Capitol, A-45460, 1932 WL 1021 (Comp. Gen. 
Nov. 11, 1932). 
 202. See, e.g., B-149858, 1978 WL 13315 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 12, 1978). 
 203. See, e.g., Cent. Intelligence Agency, B-250377, 1993 WL 35613 (Comp. 
Gen. Jan. 28, 1993). 
 204. See, e.g., Sec’y of Agric., 22 Comp. Gen. 74 (1942). 
 205. Int’l Cooperation Admin., B-133913, 1958 WL 2065 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 
21, 1958). 
 206. See REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 12-41. 
 207. See 31 U.S.C. § 1535(b) (2006) (requiring exact payments on the basis 
of “the actual cost of goods or services provided”). 
 208. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 72 Comp. Gen. 120, 120 (1993). 
 209. Id. at 121. 
 210. Id. at 122. 
 211. Id. at 121. 
 212. See id. at 120–21 (denying the Bureau’s request to use excess funding 
for subsequent related studies). 
 213. Id. at 122. 
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One effect of this holding was that the Bureau realized 
none of the efficiency gains from the interagency agreement.214 
Presumably, the Bureau performed the study for less money 
than the Council could have, thus saving the Council money. 
But the Council could not share these savings with the Bureau 
because, under the Economy Act, the Council could not pay the 
Bureau anything more than the Bureau’s actual costs.215 In the 
end, only the Council could enjoy the savings generated by the 
Economy Act agreement.216 The same effect arises whenever a 
performing agency performs a task for less money than it would 
have cost the ordering agency to do the job. That is, by barring 
profits for the performing agency, the actual cost rule ensures 
that only the ordering agency—and not the performing agen-
cy—enjoys savings and efficiency gains from Economy Act 
agreements.217  
Aside from barring profits for performing agencies, the ac-
tual cost rule has another significant effect: it prevents the or-
dering agency from providing the performing agency with non-
monetary consideration in lieu of some or all of the actual costs 
of the services.218  
The common law of contracts requires that parties to a con-
tract offer some form of bargained-for consideration.219 But 
money does not have to be involved in the transaction.220 Ac-
cording to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, consideration 
can be a “promise,” “an act other than a promise,” “a forbear-
ance,” or “the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal 
relation.”221  
Such a permissive view of consideration does not apply to 
ordering agencies under the Economy Act.222 The actual cost 
 
 214. See id. (holding that the Bureau could not use the money it saved for 
other projects). 
 215. See 31 U.S.C. § 1535(b) (2006) (providing no exceptions to the stated 
requirement that payments be made on the basis of “the actual cost of goods or 
services provided”). 
 216. See Bureau of Land Mgmt., 72 Comp. Gen. 120 (1993). 
 217. For a discussion of the implications of this perverse effect of the actual 
cost rule, see infra Part III.B. 
 218. See 31 U.S.C. § 1535(b) (emphasizing that payment shall be made by 
“check”). 
 219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: REQUIREMENT OF EX-
CHANGE; TYPES OF EXCHANGE § 71 (2002). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. 31 U.S.C. § 1535(b) (requiring prompt payment by check on the “writ-
ten request of the agency . . . filling the order”). 
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rule requires that the ordering agency pay the performing 
agency money.223 The ordering agency cannot offer a different 
form of consideration in lieu of some or all of the cash needed 
for full reimbursement of the performing agency’s costs.224 For 
example, the ordering agency cannot offer as consideration a 
promise to forbear from performing a task that interferes with 
the performing agency’s operations. Instead, it must offer mon-
ey.225 No other form of consideration will suffice if the money 
does not cover the performing agency’s actual costs.226  
This restriction on nonmonetary consideration can affect 
interagency negotiations on services provided in the interagen-
cy marketplace. For example, in one case, the Air Force was 
negotiating with the State Department over how to split the 
costs of the agencies’ activities during missions overseas.227 As 
part of the negotiations, the Air Force asked the Comptroller 
General whether it could write off some of the debt owed to it 
by the State Department for airlift services received under 
Economy Act agreements.228 The Comptroller General said that 
the Air Force could not.229 The Air Force had to bill the State 
Department for the airlifts because “an agency may not forego 
collection of all required costs in a reimbursable transaction” 
under the Economy Act.230 
The introduction of the actual cost rule significantly re-
laxed prior legal constraints on exchanges in the interagency 
marketplace by allowing performing agencies to recoup their 
full costs. But the rule constrains fund transfers in the inter-
agency marketplace in two ways: (1) it prevents performing 
agencies from reaping profits for their services;231 and (2) it pre-
vents performing agencies from receiving nonmonetary consid-
eration in lieu of some or all of the actual costs of the services 
provided.232 
 
 223. Id. 
 224. See id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Dep't of the Air Force, B-214972, 1985 WL 286656 (Comp. Gen. Apr. 
26, 1985). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See 31 U.S.C. § 1535(b) (capping the compensation value at the actual 
cost of providing the goods or services, thus failing to leave room for compen-
sation beyond such a value). 
 232. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 72 Comp. Gen. 120 (1993) (emphasizing the 
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2. The Deobligation Rule 
The deobligation rule involves a bit of esoteric, but impact-
ful, appropriations law. The rule mandates that, upon entering 
into an Economy Act agreement, an ordering agency must “ob-
ligate” funds to pay the performing agency.233 However, if the 
funds expire before the performing agency fulfills its duties un-
der the agreement, the ordering agency must “deobligate” the 
funds and reimburse the agency using newly obligated and un-
expired funds.234 While seemingly innocuous, the rule has effec-
tively stripped ordering agencies of significant amounts of 
money.  
The purpose of the deobligation rule is to protect Con-
gress’s ability to control agency behavior by limiting the 
amount of money available to agencies.235 When Congress ap-
propriates funds to agencies, the funds have a limited shelf life, 
after which time they expire.236 The typical appropriation lasts 
for a single fiscal year and expires with the passing of that 
year.237 Thus, if agencies do not use all of the money appropri-
ated for a fiscal year, they must return that money to the U.S. 
Treasury at the end of the fiscal year. Congress enacted the 
deobligation rule to prevent agencies from extending the life of 
their appropriations beyond the set time limits.238 Without the 
deobligation requirement, it could be possible for an agency 
with money left over at the end of a fiscal year to obligate those 
funds for services to be provided by another agency a year or 
two later—in effect circumventing congressional spending lim-
its by allowing funds to retain purchasing power long after 
 
requisite monetary compensation). 
 233. 31 U.S.C. § 1535(d) (“An order placed or agreement made under this 
section obligates an appropriation of the ordering agency or unit.”). 
 234. Id. (“The amount obligated is deobligated to the extent that the agency 
or unit filling the order has not incurred obligations, before the end of the pe-
riod of availability of the appropriation . . . .”). 
 235. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 621(a) (2006) (declaring that “it is essential . . . to 
assure congressional control over the budgetary process”). 
 236. See 31 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (explaining that appropriated funds are avail-
able only for expenses incurred during the “period of availability” established 
for the funds). 
 237. For a discussion of Congress’s annual “appropriations process” and its 
“striking regularities,” see Lance T. LeLoup & William B. Moreland, Agency 
Strategies and Executive Review: The Hidden Politics of Budgeting, 38 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 232 (1978). 
 238. See Sec’y of Agric., 31 Comp. Gen. 83, 85 (1951) (noting that the avail-
ability of an ordering agency’s funds is restricted to the period provided by the 
appropriating act). 
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Congress intended the funds to dry up. If agencies could extend 
their purchasing power in this way, it could make it harder for 
Congress to keep track of and limit agency spending for a given 
year—thereby weakening a crucial legislative check on execu-
tive powers.  
While the deobligation rule helps preserve congressional 
dominance over agency spending, the rule also has significant 
costs. The rule can cause funds to effectively disappear from 
ordering agencies’ budgets. To illustrate how agencies lose 
funds because of the deobligation requirement, consider a fact 
pattern that has arisen in at least a couple of Comptroller Gen-
eral opinions.239 Agency A hires Agency B to perform a study. 
Agency A obligates funds to pay for the study from the current 
fiscal year, FY1. However, Agency B does not perform and 
complete the study until the next fiscal year, FY2. Agency A 
has to reimburse Agency B for the study from FY2 funds. The 
FY1 funds cannot be used because those funds have expired 
and cannot by law be carried over to the next fiscal year. Those 
FY1 funds generally cannot be used for any other purpose ei-
ther, because they have expired and are permanently lost to 
the agency.  
Agencies can try to avoid this loss of funds through scrupu-
lous accounting, but this is not always such an easy task. Even 
in a specific case in which the ordering agency asked the per-
forming agency to submit “monthly progress reports and 
statements of costs incurred,” the agency still failed to precisely 
obligate and deobligate funds over the course of a multi-year 
Economy Act agreement.240 The ordering agency lost funds as a 
result.241  
In short, the deobligation rule is an arcane but significant 
source of fiscal pain for ordering agencies. 
3. The Lower-Cost Rule 
Under the Economy Act, an agency is not free to contract 
with whomever it pleases.242 Before hiring an agency in the in-
teragency marketplace, an ordering agency must show that it 
 
 239. See, e.g., Chairman, Comm. on Educ. and Labor, B-223833, 1987 WL 
103317 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 5, 1987); Sec’y of the Army, B-134099, 1957 WL 
1624 (Comp. Gen. Dec. 13, 1957). 
 240. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearm, 58 Comp. Gen. 471, 473 
(1979). 
 241. Id. at 475. 
 242. See 31 U.S.C. § 1535(a)(4) (2006). 
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cannot receive the same services “as conveniently or cheaply” 
from a commercial enterprise.243 That is, the performing agency 
must be able to provide the services at a lower cost than a pri-
vate firm could.244  
The lower-cost rule came about because, when Congress 
debated the Economy Act, some legislators worried that agen-
cies would begin to rely on interagency services too much and 
take away public contracts from private firms.245 One legislator, 
for example, was specifically concerned that the Army Corps of 
Engineers would use the Act to hire the Navy Department for 
maintenance work instead of hiring businesses in his home  
district.246  
The lower-cost rule does not create an even playing field 
between public agencies and private contractors, though. Ra-
ther, it is biased in favor of private contractors. If an agency 
cannot determine that the cost of dealing with another agency 
is cheaper than the cost of dealing with a private contractor, 
then the agency cannot enter into the Economy Act transac-
tion.247 For example, in one case, the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
hired the Department of Veteran Affairs to provide drug testing 
services.248 A private company filed an action in federal court to 
enjoin the agreement, alleging that “the Bureau had improper-
ly determined that [Veteran Affairs] could provide the services 
more conveniently or cheaply than a commercial enterprise.”249 
The Bureau ultimately agreed to scrap the interagency agree-
ment and seek bids from private firms.250  
The lower-cost rule does not apply to every Economy Act 
transaction, though.251 It only applies to services that are “law-
fully procurable” from private contractors and not to the per-
 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. E.g., Hearings, supra note 120, at 9. 
 246. Id. 
 247. See, e.g., Seattle Laundry & Dry Cleaning Inst., 37 Comp. Gen. 16, 18 
(1957) (explaining that if work can be as conveniently or cheaply performed by 
private agencies as government agencies, then such contracts must be open to 
competitive bids from private agencies). 
 248. Accu-Lab Med. Testing, B-270259, 1996 WL 72343 (Comp. Gen. Feb. 
20, 1996). 
 249. Id. 
 250. See id. (agreeing with the protesting agency that “there are numerous 
capable small businesses which can offer the solicited drug testing services at 
fair market prices”). 
 251. Sec’y of the Interior, 19 Comp. Gen. 941, 943 (1940). 
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formance of “regular governmental functions.”252 But contrac-
tors can legally provide an array of services, and if a private 
contractor can provide a service as cheaply as a public agency 
can, the lower-cost rule dictates that the job go to the private 
contractor.253  
D. PROCEDURAL CHECKS ON ECONOMY ACT AGREEMENTS 
In the previous two Sections, I discussed the Economy Act’s 
substantive rules governing the interagency marketplace. In 
this Section, I discuss the legal procedures through which those 
rules are enforced. I show that procedural shortcomings give 
ample room for agencies to enter into agreements that may vio-
late substantive Economy Act rules.  
Review by the Comptroller General is the most important 
procedural tool for supervising agreements under the Economy 
Act.254 During the drafting of the Economy Act, legislators con-
sidered mandating that the Comptroller General screen all 
proposed Economy Act agreements before they took effect.255 
This idea was rejected primarily because it would significantly 
delay the services provided under the interagency agree-
ments.256 Instead, the Comptroller General was charged with 
reviewing only a portion of agreements made under the Econ-
omy Act.257 In practice, the Comptroller General typically issues 
opinions before agencies finalize Economy Act agreements only 
when the agencies themselves request an advisory opinion.258 
The Comptroller General typically reviews interagency agree-
ments only after Congress requests a review.259 But if neither 
the agencies themselves nor Congress requests a Comptroller 
General opinion, then Economy Act agreements are likely to go 
without scrutiny.  
 
 252. Id. 
 253. See 31 U.S.C. § 1535(a)(4) (2006). 
 254. See John Cibinic, Jr. & Jesse E. Lasken, The Comptroller General and 
Government Contracts, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 349, 350 (1970) (arguing that 
“Comptroller General decisions are the primary source of guidance on permis-
sible uses of appropriated funds and are considered by many to be the final 
word on the propriety of questionable payments”). 
 255. See Hearings, supra note 120, at 32. 
 256. See id. at 32. 
 257. See 31 U.S.C. § 3529. 
 258. See id. (permitting agencies to request decisions from the Comptroller 
General regarding particular classes of questions).  
 259. Id. § 712 (authorizing the Comptroller General to investigate the use 
of public appropriations upon the request of Congress). 
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Comptroller General review is also available at the request 
of outside parties.260 However, this review process is designed to 
allow private contractors to protest the results of public bids for 
government contracts.261 It is not set up to foster review of in-
teragency redelegation or even interagency contracts for the 
procurement of goods when no public bids were sought, which 
is almost always the case for Economy Act agreements.  
Outside of this spotty Comptroller General review, there 
are few, if any, procedural checks on agency agreements under 
the Economy Act. Most importantly, Economy Act agreements 
are not subject to the procedures established in the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA).262  
The APA provides the most comprehensive procedural 
rules governing agency behavior.263 For example, it requires 
that agencies publish all of their “substantive rules” and 
“statements of general policy” in the Federal Register, an offi-
cial daily government publication.264 For proposed rulemakings, 
the APA goes further. Section 553 of the APA establishes pro-
cedures known as notice-and-comment rulemaking that require 
agencies to publish proposed rulemakings in the Federal Regis-
ter, solicit public comments for their proposals, and consider 
these comments before promulgating a final rule.265 These no-
tice-and-comment procedures are designed to ensure that agen-
cies’ decisions are transparent and responsive to a diversity of 
interests.266 The accountability gains from these notice-and-
comment procedures are so great that Cass Sunstein has called 
Section 553 of the APA arguably “the greatest invention of 
 
 260. See id. §§ 3551–56 (describing the process by which “interested parties” 
may protest procurement actions and obtain Comptroller General review). 
 261. See id. § 3551(1)(E) (permitting parties to protest the “[c]onversion of 
a function that is being performed by Federal employees to private sector per-
formance,” but not providing for protests of interagency redelegation). 
 262. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2006) (defining “agency” for purposes of the 
APA). 
 263. See id. §§ 551–59 (outlining extensive mechanisms for regulating the 
actions of administrative agencies). 
 264. Id. § 552(a)(1)(D). 
 265. Id. § 553. 
 266. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 211 
(2006) (noting that along with transparency and responsiveness, notice-and-
comment rulemaking also ensures reason-giving). But see Cass R. Sunstein, 
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. Rev. 29, 61–62 (1985) 
(describing recent doctrinal innovations in administrative law that have trans-
formed notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
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modern government.”267  
However, agreements under the Economy Act are not cov-
ered by these most fundamental of administrative proce-
dures.268 Economy Act agreements do not meet the definition of 
agency policies and actions that are subject to APA provi-
sions.269 No other statutes require agencies to publicize their 
Economy Act agreements.270 Thus, Economy Act agreements 
generally remain out of public sight and entirely free from no-
tice-and-comment procedures.  
Along with Section 553 of the APA, judicial review has 
been hailed as one of the greatest procedural checks on agency 
behavior.271 It is a bedrock principle of administrative law and 
our separation-of-powers system that important decisions by 
executive agencies can be subject to review by an independent 
federal judiciary.272 However, judicial review of Economy Act 
agreements is highly unlikely.  
Under justiciability doctrine and Section 702 of the APA,273 
private parties have standing to challenge an agency action in 
federal court if they can show either: (1) that the agency’s au-
thorizing statute expressly states that a party adversely affect-
ed or aggrieved by an action taken under the statute has stand-
ing;274 or (2) that the party has suffered an injury arguably 
 
 267. Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Cass Sunstein Wants to Nudge Us, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., May 13, 2010, at 38, 42. 
 268. For an argument that the APA imposes too little control on agency ac-
tion to the detriment of the administrative process, see Edward Rubin, It's 
Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL 
L. REV. 95, 98 (2003). 
 269. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (defining “agency” for purposes of the APA); see 
also § 551(13) (defining “agency action”). 
 270. But see KATE M. MANUEL & BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 
40814, INTERAGENCY CONTRACTING: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL PROCURE-
MENT AND APPROPRIATIONS LAW (2010) (noting that because of “widely report-
ed incidents of mismanagement” of interagency contracts, Congress has re-
cently enacted new statutes addressing such contacts). 
 271. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive 
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 537 (1989) (arguing 
that judicial review prevents arbitrariness, avoids undesirable regulation, and 
brings about important regulatory controls). 
 272. See id. at 522 (suggesting that “judicial review of administrative ac-
tion is necessary . . . to ensure that regulatory agencies comply with congres-
sional commands”). 
 273. 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
 274. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476–77 
(1940). 
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within the “zone of interests” that the authorizing statute was 
designed to protect.275  
The Economy Act does not expressly state that an ag-
grieved party has standing to challenge Economy Act agree-
ments,276 and there is no indication that Congress designed the 
statute to protect any private zone of interests. Thus, the Econ-
omy Act appears to fail both tests for creating judicially cog-
nizable rights in private parties. As a result, it is unlikely that 
a court will allow a party to challenge the validity of an Econo-
my Act agreement, though the issue has not been directly ad-
dressed by federal courts.277  
Overall, Economy Act agreements are sometimes subject to 
Comptroller General review, never subject to the APA, and un-
likely to be subject to judicial review. Agencies may be able to 
exploit these procedural shortcomings to enter into Economy 
Act agreements that violate substantive Economy Act law. In-
deed, in at least one instance in 2010, agencies entered into an 
Economy Act agreement that redelegated far more significant 
decision-making authority than the Comptroller General had 
previously allowed under its case law.278 The agreement in-
volves the 2010 health care reform statute, officially known as 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.279 The Act puts 
 
 275. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156–
57 (1970) (holding that the APA serves a broadly remedial purpose and that 
there is “no presumption against judicial review an in favor of administrative 
absolutism”). 
 276. See 31 U.S.C. § 1535 (2006) (authorizing heads of agencies to place or-
ders within their agencies or other agencies, but not mentioning whether 
agency heads may challenge agreements made pursuant to the Act). 
 277. In FDIC v. Hurwitz, bank managers filed a claim against the FDIC 
seeking damages for the agency’s violation of the Economy Act. 384 F. Supp. 
2d 1039, 1039–40 (S.D. Tex. 2005). The FDIC responded that, “[n]othing in 
[the Economy Act] indicates that Congress intended to allow any private party 
unhappy with a discretionary action by an agency to sue for damages on the 
ground that the agency expended funds in violation of appropriations and [the 
bank managers] cite no case authority permitting such actions.” FDIC’s Mo-
tion to Dismiss Counterclaim and Memorandum in Support at 26, Hurwitz, 
384 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (No. 95-3956), 2003 WL 25753868. In response, the 
managers dropped their Economy Act-based claim and the court never had to 
decide whether the FDIC was correct that there is no cause of action for viola-
tions of the Economy Act. Response to FDIC’s Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim 
at 2, Hurwitz, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1039.  
 278. See Privacy Act of 1974: New System of Records, 75 Fed. Reg. 179, 
56,601 (Sept. 16, 2010) (describing an arrangement in which one agency dele-
gated authority for reviewing insurance coverage claims to another agency). 
 279. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified in scattered sections of the 
Internal Revenue Code and 21, 25, 29, 42 U.S.C.). 
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the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in 
charge of regulating the external appeals process for insurance 
coverage determinations by private insurers.280 The Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) has long run a similar appeals 
process for federal employees.281 To take advantage of OPM’s 
expertise here, HHS redelegated to OPM the “authority to ad-
minister the program, using an arrangement under the Econo-
my Act.”282 Under the agreement, OPM is to “[t]rack and report 
to HHS on the administration of the program”283—a provision 
presumably added to the interagency agreement to help satisfy 
the Comptroller General’s requirement that an ordering agency 
retain responsibility for the contracted task.  
Despite this provision, the agreement appears to violate 
Economy Act law by redelegating significant decision-making 
authority. The agreement redelegates the authority to adminis-
ter regulations that involve important binding decisions, such 
as whether health insurers’ denials of coverage determinations 
are valid or whether the insurers must pay the patients’ health 
costs, to OPM.284 The Comptroller General has never allowed 
the redelegation of such significant decision-making authority 
before.285 However, unless the agreement is brought to the at-
tention of the Comptroller General by Congress or the agencies 
themselves, it will likely go forward.286  
Because Economy Act agreements are generally not made 
public, it is difficult to know how many of these agreements 
may violate Economy Act law. But because of the spotty review 
procedures under the Economy Act, it is predictable that this 
HHS-OPM Economy Act agreement is not the only example of 
agencies pushing the bounds of the legal restrictions on activi-
ties in the interagency marketplace in order to achieve efficien-
cies.  
 
 280. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(c) (2006) (delegating external review process 
authority to the secretary). 
 281. See Notice: Privacy Act of 1974: New System of Records, 75 Fed. Reg. 
56,001, 56,001 (Sept. 16, 2010) (referencing the Federal Employees Health 
Benefits Program appeal process). 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 56,602. 
 284. See id. (discussing the purpose for the system). 
 285. See supra Part II.B. 
 286. See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text. 
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III.  AMENDING THE ECONOMY ACT OF 1932   
In Part I, I described the constitutional default rules re-
stricting the interagency marketplace. In Part II, I described 
the extent to which the Economy Act relaxes these restrictions. 
In this Part, I argue for amendments to the Economy Act that 
would further relax these restrictions. Most controversially, I 
propose amending the Economy Act to allow agencies to 
redelegate a reasonable amount of authority to other qualified 
agencies. To prevent the abuse of these new powers, I would 
subject all proposed redelegations to notice-and-comment pro-
cedures and I would grant standing rights to parties aggrieved 
by redelegations. As for interagency fund transfers, I propose 
amending the Act so that: (1) performing agencies can profit 
from the services they provide under the Economy Act; (2) per-
forming agencies can accept nonmonetary forms of considera-
tion in lieu of full reimbursement of their actual costs; and (3) 
the deobligation and lower-cost rules are replaced or eliminated. 
A. AMENDING THE ECONOMY ACT TO ALLOW MORE 
INTERAGENCY REDELEGATION 
Current Economy Act case law allows some redelegation, 
but only for tasks that involve little discretionary decision-
making.287 Loosening this restriction on redelegation would al-
low agencies to fix a greater share of inefficient jurisdictional 
arrangements by redelegating authority to the agency best po-
sitioned to regulate.288 However, broader redelegation powers 
would also pose concerns that executive agencies could some-
how abuse their new powers.289 In this Section, I propose 
amendments to the Economy Act that would balance efficiency, 
accountability, and separation of powers concerns by: (1) per-
mitting the redelegation of a reasonable amount of authority to 
a qualified agency; (2) subjecting all proposed redelegations to 
notice-and-comment procedures; (3) granting aggrieved parties 
standing rights in court; and (4) barring the redelegation of au-
thority from independent agencies to non-independent agen-
cies. I first discuss how interagency redelegation can improve 
governmental efficiencies. I then discuss why broader 
redelegation powers would raise accountability and separation 
of powers concerns. I then lay out my proposal for broader 
 
 287. See supra Part II.B. 
 288. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 289. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 924 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:886 
 
redelegation powers and greater checks on those powers.  
1. The Likely Efficiency Gains from Broadening Redelegation 
Powers 
Effective regulation requires expertise, experience, and re-
sources. Sometimes, the agency charged with a regulatory task 
is the wrong agency to regulate because it does not have the 
best mix of these qualities. It is inefficient when the wrong 
agency has authority to perform a task because that agency has 
to waste resources building up the expertise and decision-
making infrastructure that another agency already possesses. 
Or, if the agency fails to build up its expertise and infrastruc-
ture, the agency risks making poor policy decisions. Agencies 
are the institutional actors most likely to know when the wrong 
agency has authority because they are the most familiar with 
the regulatory problems and with how their capacities to ad-
dress those problems compare with other agencies’ capacities.290 
If this agency knowledge were complemented with broader 
redelegation powers, agencies could fix many inefficient juris-
dictional arrangements by redelegating authority to the agency 
best positioned to regulate.  
When Congress grants regulatory authority to the wrong 
agency, it is primarily because of three shortcomings in the leg-
islative drafting process—all of which agencies could correct for 
through interagency redelegation.  
First, the wrong agency—that is, the agency without the 
best mix of expertise, experience, and resources—may have au-
thority because Congress has delegated in broad, ambiguous 
terms.291 Congress often must delegate in broad terms to ensure 
that agencies have the legal flexibility they need to regulate ef-
fectively.292 Nevertheless, such broad delegations often lead to 
the wrong agency having authority to perform a task. Implicit 
in broad delegations is the power to perform a bundle of tasks 
related to a statutory purpose. In our regulatory system, where 
agencies’ jurisdictions and expertise routinely overlap,293 it is 
 
 290. See Marisam, supra note 2, at 210–14 (indicating that agencies them-
selves take limited action to avoid duplication between agency programs). 
 291. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Pow-
er: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 1035, 1036–37 (2006). 
 292. See Marisam, supra note 2, at 191. 
 293. See generally Marisam, supra note 2 (discussing the duplicative dele-
gations incorporated into the United States’ regulatory system).  
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inevitable that some of the tasks in a bundle will touch on the 
expertise of agencies different from the one Congress has 
named in the statute. In some instances, different agencies 
may have such an expertise advantage over the agency named 
in the statute that it would be better if these different agencies 
performed the tasks instead.  
With broader redelegation powers, agencies could divvy up 
these bundles of tasks in ways that would bring about more ef-
ficient jurisdictional arrangements. For example, Congress has 
mandated that the Department of Veterans Affairs give prefer-
ential treatment to small, veteran-owned businesses when 
awarding government contracts.294 Implicit in this mandate is 
the authority to determine whether a particular business meets 
the statutory definition of “small.” The Small Business Admin-
istration (SBA) has far more experience making these sorts of 
status determinations than Veterans Affairs does. Indeed, the 
SBA already has a decision-making process set up to determine 
whether a business is “small” for the purposes of receiving gov-
ernment money.295 If Veterans Affairs could redelegate to the 
SBA its authority to determine whether a particular business is 
“small,” then the decision-making authority would rest with the 
more expert decision maker.  
Second, the wrong agency may have authority because 
regulatory conditions have changed in ways that were unfore-
seeable to the enacting Congress.296 When legislators draft 
statutes, they cannot predict how regulatory environments will 
change.297 Some of these unforeseeable changes will inevitably 
affect which agency is best suited to perform a task.  
Again, with broader redelegation powers, agencies could 
correct for these unforeseeable regulatory changes by transfer-
ring authority to the agency best positioned to regulate. For ex-
ample, Congress long ago delegated to the Department of Agri-
 
 294. 38 U.S.C. §§ 8127–28 (2006). 
 295. See Determining Business Size, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba 
.gov/content/determining-business-size ( last visited Dec. 6, 2011) (outlining 
the process to determine business size and stating that “all federal agencies 
must use SBA size standards for contracts identified as small business”). 
 296. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE 
L.J. 389, 397–98 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After 
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2089–90 (1990); Adrian Vermeule, The Su-
preme Court, 2008 Term–Foreword, System Effects and the Constitution, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 19 (2009). 
 297. See Marisam, supra note 2, at 193. 
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culture authority to regulate plant pests.298 At the time, genet-
ically modified plants did not exist. Today, however, genetically 
modified plants make up a substantial percentage of agricul-
ture. These genetically modified plants pose potentially signifi-
cant environmental risks that were unforeseeable to the enact-
ing Congress because the plants did not exist then.299 It would 
be efficient if Agriculture could redelegate some of its authority 
to regulate plants to an agency with more environmental ex-
pertise, such as the EPA.300 Agriculture could retain the author-
ity relevant to its farming expertise, but redelegate the tasks 
more relevant to environmental protection—in this way craft-
ing a more efficient jurisdictional arrangement. 
Finally, the wrong agency may have authority simply be-
cause legislators made a mistake. Legislators draft statutes 
under time pressure and without perfect information.301 Under 
these conditions, mistakes are inevitable. Congress will invari-
ably delegate some task to the wrong agency.  
Again, broader redelegation powers would let agencies fix 
these congressional errors. For example, the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act of 2010 is an incredibly comprehensive 
2400 page statute that Congress drafted in a matter of weeks. 
It contains hundreds of mandates for agencies.302 Inevitably, 
some of those mandates are addressed to the wrong agency, er-
rors that agencies could fix through redelegation. Indeed, the 
example I discussed earlier, in which HHS redelegated to OPM 
 
 298. See Federal Plant Pest Act of 1957, 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa–jj (1958), re-
pealed by Pub. L. No. 106-224, tit. IV, § 438(a)(2), 114 Stat. 454 (2000). The 
Department’s plant protection powers are now codified in the Plant Protection 
Act. 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–86 (2006). 
 299. See, e.g., Zachary R. F. Schreiner, Comment, Frankenfuel: Genetically 
Modified Corn, Ethanol, and Crop Diversity, 30 ENERGY L.J. 169, 173 (2009). 
 300. The EPA has authority to regulate genetically modified plants only if 
they are designed to resist pests. See 7 U.S.C. § 136. Plants modified for other 
purposes, such as to improve yield or boost nutrient levels, are outside the 
EPA’s jurisdiction, despite any environmental risks. See Gregory N. Mandel, 
Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of 
Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2221–
30 (2004). 
 301. See Marisam, supra note 2, at 191; Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, 
The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 885 (2007); Daniel B. Rodri-
guez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1, 71 (1994); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private En-
forcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. 
L. REV. 93, 134 (2005). 
 302. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified in scattered sections of the 
I.R.C. and 21, 25, 29, 42 U.S.C). 
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the authority to establish external review processes for health 
insurers, may be an instance of agencies trying to correct for 
imperfect delegations in the Act. OPM has far more experience 
than HHS regulating such health insurance coverage determi-
nations.303 Thus, it made sense for HHS to redelegate its au-
thority to the more expert OPM.  
This example of redelegation between HHS and OPM sug-
gests that agencies may already be reshaping inefficient juris-
dictional arrangements through redelegation. However, be-
cause of the current legal restrictions on interagency 
redelegation, it is unlikely that agencies are engaging in an op-
timal amount of redelegation. Some agencies may hesitate to 
redelegate significant decision-making authority because of the 
risk of being overturned by the Comptroller General.304 Other 
agencies may avoid redelegating authority because they place a 
value on abiding by public laws that govern agency behavior, 
regardless of the risk of being caught. Similarly, some agencies 
may avoid redelegation because the codified rules against 
redelegation have cemented an agency norm against 
redelegation.305 Ultimately, without a broadening of 
redelegation powers, agencies are unlikely to engage in an op-
timal amount of redelegation.  
In general, there are many reasons why the wrong agency 
may have authority to perform a task. Broader redelegation 
powers would permit agencies to rectify many of these ineffi-
cient jurisdictional arrangements. In some instances, agencies 
may already have pushed beyond the limits that the Comptrol-
ler General has placed on redelegation powers. But it would be 
better if agencies did not have to risk violating substantive pub-
lic law in order to fix inefficient jurisdictional arrangements. 
2. The Potential Abuse of Broader Redelegation Powers 
Broader redelegation powers would improve governmental 
efficiencies, but they would also lead to greater concerns about 
agencies’ abuse of those redelegation powers. As discussed be-
low, agencies with broad redelegation powers could make 
 
 303. See Notice: Privacy Act of 1974: New System of Records, 75 Fed. Reg. 
56,601, 56,601 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
 304. See supra Part II.B (discussing situations in which the Comptroller 
General prohibits or limits interagency redelegation). 
 305. See generally Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in 
Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL. STUD. 765 (1998) (generalizing that respect 
for symbols of government creates social norms to which actors conform). 
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redelegation decisions that are arbitrary or overly political and 
that diverge too much from congressional preferences. The cur-
rent procedural checks on Economy Act agreements are insuffi-
cient to guard against these potential misuses of redelegation 
powers.  
Broad redelegation powers would enable an agency to 
transfer authority to any number of different agencies. It mat-
ters which agency is selected to receive a redelegation of regu-
latory power because different agencies will regulate the same 
problem differently. Different agencies are responsive to differ-
ent interest groups and have different internal decision-making 
processes. For example, the EPA is often assumed to be more 
responsive to environmental interests when compared to indus-
try-specific agencies such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion, which are often assumed to be more responsive to the in-
terests of the industries that they regulate. As a result, these 
different agencies would take different policy approaches to the 
same regulatory problem. 
Ideally, agencies would redelegate authority to the most 
expert agency. But they could also redelegate authority to an 
agency for wholly arbitrary or overly political reasons. For ex-
ample, the president could influence agencies to redelegate au-
thority to another agency because that agency is more respon-
sive to interests friendly to the president. Imagine a president 
with close ties to oil companies pressuring the EPA to 
redelegate the authority to set air pollution standards for off-
shore oil projects to the Department of the Interior, a depart-
ment with a history of lax enforcement of oil companies.306 Such 
a redelegation would be undesirable because it would benefit one 
particular interest group at the expense of the public good.307  
From a separation-of-powers perspective, the risk of unto-
ward presidential influence in redelegation decisions would be 
greatest during times of divided government, when different 
political parties control the White House and Congress. Imag-
ine a Democratic Congress delegating a task to the Department 
of Labor only to have a Republican President influence Labor to 
 
 306. See, e.g., Eric Lipton & John M. Broder, Regulators’ Warnings Weren’t 
Acted On, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2010, at A12. 
 307. However, under a strong unitary theory of the executive, such 
redelegations may actually be considered efficient if they allow the president 
to more easily ensure the regulatory outcomes that he desires. See, e.g., Steven 
G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. 
REV. 23, 58 (1995) (arguing that the President should be “able in theory to di-
rect all matters that involve policy discretion”). 
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redelegate that task to the Department of Commerce because 
Commerce is friendlier to the business interests that donated 
money to the President. Unless Congress could muster a veto-
proof majority, the President would have effectively thwarted 
an important agency design decision—a decision that, under 
our constitutional system, should rest primarily with the legis-
lature and not the executive. Such a redelegation would be 
troubling because of its blatant disregard for congressional 
preferences about which agency should perform a task.  
A redelegation could also raise separation of powers prob-
lems if it involved a transfer of authority from an independent 
agency to a dependent agency. Congress places authority with 
independent agencies because their policy decisions are sup-
posed to be relatively insulated from presidential influence.308 If 
an independent agency redelegated its decision-making author-
ity to a dependent agency with closer ties to the President, then 
Congress’s desire to insulate that decision-making function 
from presidential control would be thwarted.  
Even without presidential involvement, broader 
redelegation powers could raise problems of democratic legiti-
macy. Legislators are elected officials who are supposed to be 
responsive to majority preferences, and our constitutional sepa-
ration of powers system places with these legislators the pri-
mary responsibility for determining agencies’ jurisdictional 
powers. Democratic legitimacy could suffer if unelected agency 
officials were to alter jurisdictional arrangements through 
redelegations in ways that departed significantly from the 
wishes of their principals in Congress, principals who are elect-
ed and generally more accountable to the public.  
In short, without sufficient procedural checks, agencies 
could end up redelegating authority for a number of bad rea-
sons. The APA and judicial review procedures are designed to 
prevent agencies from generally making decisions that are ar-
bitrary, overly political, or depart too significantly from con-
gressional preferences. But Economy Act agreements are not 
subject to the APA and generally not subject to judicial review. 
Without these crucial checks, granting agencies broad 
 
 308. But see Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: 
Seperation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 588–91 
(arguing that though “independent agencies are often free, at least in a formal 
sense, of other relationships with the White House that characterize the exec-
utive-branch agencies,” the executive branch still influences the actions of in-
dependent agencies in ways that are “less direct and generally more subtle”). 
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redelegation powers would lead to substantial risks that the 
executive branch could get away with arbitrary or excessively 
political redelegations and redelegations that thwart congres-
sional desires.  
3. Amending the Economy Act to Broaden Redelegation 
Powers and Check the Potential Abuse of Redelegation Powers 
To improve governmental efficiency, I suggest amending 
the Economy Act to permit the redelegation of a reasonable 
amount of authority to a qualified agency. To check the poten-
tial abuse of these broader redelegation powers, I suggest 
amending the Economy Act to state that all proposed 
redelegations under the Act must go through notice-and-
comment procedures and that all parties aggrieved by a 
redelegation have standing to challenge the redelegation in 
court. To protect congressional interests and preserve the bal-
ance of powers among the branches, I propose barring the 
redelegation of authority from independent to dependent agen-
cies. These amendments would give agencies far freer rein to 
redelegate authority and thereby fix inefficient jurisdictional 
arrangements and save money. At the same time, they would 
subject redelegation proposals to robust procedural checks and 
constraints that currently do not apply to Economy Act agree-
ments.  
a. Allowing Redelegation of a Reasonable Amount of Authority 
to a Qualified Agency 
Allowing redelegation—but only a reasonable amount and 
to a qualified agency—would improve efficiencies without un-
duly altering the balance of powers among the branches of gov-
ernment. My intent in proposing the reasonableness standard 
is to bar agencies from redelegating their entire duties under 
comprehensive regulatory schemes that Congress put them in 
charge of administering. Our constitutional separation-of-
powers system gives Congress primary power to determine 
agencies’ powers.309 And major questions such as which agency 
should administer a comprehensive regulatory scheme should 
continue to fall to Congress.  
However, the reasonableness standard should generally al-
low an agency to redelegate some subset of its authority to a 
qualified agency—that is, an agency with the expertise, experi-
 
 309. See id. 
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ence, and resources to handle the task. The balance of powers 
among the branches is not so threatened when executive agen-
cies use their superior knowledge about regulatory conditions 
to tweak jurisdictional arrangements in this way.  
Comprehensive authorizing statutes are often replete with 
inefficiencies that could be fixed through reasonable relegations 
that tweak the jurisdictional bounds among agencies. For ex-
ample, the Clean Water Act grants the EPA broad authority to 
regulate emissions into waterways.310 Implicit in this broad del-
egation is the authority to regulate an array of pollutants that 
are expelled into waterways.311 It should be unreasonable for 
the EPA to redelegate its entire broad standard-setting and 
permitting authority under the Clean Water Act to another 
agency, no matter the agency’s qualifications. But it could be 
reasonable for the EPA to redelegate the far more limited au-
thority to set standards for ships’ ballast water discharges to 
the Coast Guard, an agency that not only has experience with 
marine habitat protection but also has far more expertise than 
the EPA when it comes to the anatomy of ships.312  
Initially, my proposal to expand agencies’ redelegation 
powers may seem radical. We are taught that a prime congres-
sional check on executive power is the legislative ability to limit 
an agency’s powers. By allowing an agency to expand its pow-
ers through interagency redelegation, my proposal may seem to 
subvert this fundamental check.  
However, when viewed in light of the history of the Econ-
omy Act, my proposal should be seen not as a radical departure 
from the law but rather as a sensible update that adapts the 
law to our modern regulatory environment while still keeping 
with the law’s historical purpose. Indeed, the same trends that 
led to the passage of the Economy Act in 1932 are present 
again today. Just as it was wise then to respond to these trends 
by expanding the scope of interagency fund transfers, it is wise 
today to respond to these trends by expanding the scope of in-
teragency redelegations. 
Recall that, in the early twentieth century, the interagency 
marketplace was almost nonexistent.313 Only a smattering of 
statutes enabled a few specific agencies to receive a limited 
 
 310. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006). 
 311. Id. § 1342(a). 
 312. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 4701–51 (2006) (delegating to the Coast Guard 
the authority to regulate invasive species in the Great Lakes). 
 313. See supra Part II.A. 
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number of services in exchange for an interagency transfer of 
funds.314 Two trends pushed Congress to enact legislation that 
encouraged far more interagency transactions: (1) the emer-
gence of newly complex regulatory problems that meant it was 
increasingly important for agencies to tap into each other’s ex-
perience and expertise; and (2) the enormous pressure on Con-
gress to find new governmental efficiencies during the Great 
Depression.315 Lifting some of the restrictions on the interagen-
cy marketplace made it easier for agencies to rely on each oth-
er’s expertise and for agencies to save money by hiring more ef-
ficient agencies to perform tasks for them.  
Similarly, today, only a smattering of agency-specific stat-
utes enables some agencies to redelegate limited authority to 
other agencies.316 Two trends compel a general expansion of 
redelegation authority in the interagency marketplace far be-
yond this smattering. First, the complexity of the most pressing 
regulatory problems is far greater than it was just a few dec-
ades ago. These complex regulatory problems implicate multi-
ple agencies’ expertise. For example, complex climate change 
issues are of deep concern to the EPA and the Departments of 
Energy, Transportation, and Agriculture.317 Moreover, complex 
financial instruments and transactions are tracked and regu-
lated by several key agencies—the Federal Reserve Board, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, and several offices in the Department of 
the Treasury.318 Adequately addressing these sorts of complex 
regulatory problems requires making the most of every agen-
cy’s expertise and experience. Broader interagency redelegation 
powers could help agencies craft jurisdictional arrangements 
that do just that.  
The second trend pushing for an expansion of interagency 
 
 314. See supra Part II.A. 
 315. See supra Part II.A. 
 316. See supra notes 156–157. 
 317. Exemplifying this, an official from each of the listed organizations sits 
on the Climate Change Science Program Interagency Committee. See Climate 
Change Science Program Interagency Committee: Officials of the Climate 
Change Science Program and Subcommittee on Global Change Research, U.S. 
CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, http://www.climatescience.gov/about/officials 
.htm ( last visited Dec. 6, 2011). 
 318. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: 
The Significance of Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Reg-
ulation, 50 BUS. LAW. 447 (1995) (analyzing the competition between agencies 
regulating financial markets and the arguments for both competition and  
consolidation). 
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redelegation is the immense pressure on Congress to find gov-
ernmental savings.319 While Congress often purports to be in-
terested in keeping down wasteful spending, today there is 
more pressure on Congress to save money than in any other 
time since the Great Depression, when the Economy Act was 
passed.320 Given this pressure, Congress is looking to cut spend-
ing in most areas of the government.321 The interagency mar-
ketplace is one area that is ripe for new efficiencies. Amending 
the Economy Act to allow for broader redelegation powers 
would save money by freeing agencies to shift tasks to agencies 
that can perform those tasks at lower costs.  
Aside from having a historical parallel in the creation of 
the Economy Act, my proposal also has statutory parallels. I 
crafted the proposal by looking to the handful of existing stat-
utes that already authorize interagency redelegation. The pro-
posed language limiting redelegations to a reasonable amount 
of authority has precedent in a statute that authorizes the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development to redelegate to 
the Department of Agriculture “a reasonable portion of the to-
tal authority to contract to make assistance payments” to low-
er-income home owners.322 Moreover, the proposed language 
limiting redelegations to only qualified agencies has precedent 
in several statutes that allow redelegation only to agencies with 
clearly relevant expertise. For example, one statute permits the 
Secretary of Labor to redelegate the authority to investigate 
certain banking functions “to the appropriate federal banking 
agency.”323 In short, my proposal for broadening redelegation 
powers hews closely to established statutory language. 
Overall, my proposed amendment to allow agencies to 
redelegate a reasonable amount of their authority to other 
qualified agencies would improve governmental efficiencies, 
and it would do so by building on the history of the Economy 
Act and the language of other statutes that currently govern 
the interagency marketplace. 
 
 319. See supra Part II.A. 
 320. Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 72-1126, at 1 (“[W]e are now confronted with indus-
trial stagnation, unemployment, a period of low commodity prices, and swin-
dling, if not disappearing, national income.”). 
 321. See Jennifer Steinhauer, House Members Offer Hundreds of Budget-
Cutting Amendments, N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS (Feb. 15, 2011, 5:35 PM), 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/house-members-offer-hundreds-of 
-budget-cutting-amendments. 
 322. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z(k) (2006). 
 323. 29 U.S.C. § 1134(c) (2006). 
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b. Subjecting Agencies’ Redelegation Decisions to Notice-and-
Comment Procedures and Judicial Review 
The new powers that I propose should not go unchecked. 
To guard against the risk that agencies will abuse their 
redelegation powers, I propose amending the Economy Act so 
that all agreements involving redelegations are subjected to no-
tice-and-comment procedures. I would also amend the Act to 
grant standing rights to parties aggrieved by redelegations 
made under the Act.  
Subjecting proposed redelegations of authority under 
Economy Act agreements to notice-and-comment procedures 
would bring transparency to what are now generally opaque 
Economy Act instruments. By forcing agencies to publish and 
consider comments on proposed redelegations, regulated enti-
ties and public interest groups would be able to monitor agen-
cies and push back on undesirable redelegations.324 For exam-
ple, regulated entities accustomed to dealing with a particular 
agency could submit comments pushing the agency to reconsid-
er redelegating authority to a new agency that has little expe-
rience dealing with the industry, and public interest groups 
could submit comments pushing the agency to reconsider 
redelegations that appear biased in favor of private industries. 
Judicial review procedures would also serve as a crucial 
check on redelegation powers. Under my amendment, a new 
provision in the Act would grant standing to parties “adversely 
affected or aggrieved” by redelegations. Congress often uses 
this language when it wants to confer standing rights on pri-
vate parties.325 Courts have construed this phrase to give stand-
ing to regulated entities challenging agency actions affecting 
them,326 and to interest groups whose members are or would be 
injured by agency actions.327  
For interagency redelegations, regulated entities could 
challenge an agency’s proposal to redelegate the authority to 
enact policies covering those entities. For example, if the EPA 
 
 324. Cf. Marisam, supra note 2, at 200–01 (stating that current notice-and-
comment requirements for administrative rules allow “regulated entities and 
other interests” to point out duplicative delegations and comment on addition-
al burdens that will be imposed on them). 
 325. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (2006). 
 326. See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153–
54, 157 (1970). 
 327. See, e.g., Nat’l Coal. to Ban Handguns v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & 
Firearms, 715 F.2d 632, 633–34 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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were to redelegate to Interior the authority to regulate air 
emissions from oil projects, then oil companies could challenge 
the redelegation in court. Some public interest groups could al-
so have standing to challenge the redelegation of authority if 
their members were somehow harmed by the redelegation. For 
example, if the EPA redelegated the authority to set air emis-
sions standards for oil projects to Interior, and Interior then 
loosened the EPA’s existing standards, a coalition of residents 
harmed by the increase in pollution from the looser standards 
could challenge the underlying interagency redelegation.328 
Once parties established they had standing, judicial review 
of an Economy Act redelegation would be determined based on 
the same APA standard that applies to all agency actions: 
whether an agency’s decision is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”329 Under 
this standard, courts evaluate the agency’s explanation and ev-
idence for its decision. The reviewing court takes a “searching 
and careful” review into “whether [the agency’s] decision was 
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether 
there has been a clear error of judgment.”330  
For redelegation actions to survive judicial review, an 
agency would have to demonstrate that it had taken a “hard 
look” at the reasonableness of the amount of authority 
redelegated and the qualifications of the agency that received 
the redelegated authority.331 Unreasonable redelegations of the 
sort that I discussed in the prior subsection should have trouble 
surviving judicial review under this standard.  
Overtly political redelegations would also have trouble 
surviving judicial review. Courts have proved willing to strike 
down agency decisions that are excessively influenced by poli-
tics. The leading case in this regard is Motor Vehicle Manufac-
turers Ass’n. v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.,332 in which 
the Supreme Court invalidated the Department of Transporta-
 
 328. Cf. Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1118–19 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (illustrating a somewhat analogous situation, in which the EPA 
disagreed with an environmental assessment and permit issuance by the Ar-
my Corps of Engineers (Corps), and a group of negatively affected citizens 
sued top-ranking Corps officials). 
 329. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
 330. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 
(1971). 
 331. See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard 
Look” Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 757–61 (2006). 
 332. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
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tion’s repeal of the passive restraint rule for seat belts, pre-
sumably because the repeal was improperly swayed by a new 
presidential administration.333 Applied to redelegation cases, 
this sort of decision would safeguard against the risk that pres-
idents would influence which agency performed a task not for 
efficiency reasons but for political reasons. For example, judi-
cial review could prevent a president from pressuring an agen-
cy to redelegate authority to a different agency that is more re-
sponsive to interest groups with close ties to the president. 
Along with the judiciary, the legislature would exert sub-
stantial influence over redelegation decisions too. Congress de-
pends on interest groups to alert it when agencies make bad 
decisions.334 With the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures in 
effect, interest groups would be aware of proposed 
redelegations and could alert Congress to any undesirable 
redelegations. Congress could then pressure agency officials in 
public hearings or behind closed doors to reverse 
redelegations.335 More definitively, Congress could amend an 
agency’s authorizing statute to strip the agency of the power to 
redelegate particular functions.336 Indeed, the mere threat of 
eviscerating an agency’s redelegation powers would stop a rea-
sonable agency from redelegating authority in a way that Con-
gress did not want.337  
Most of the time, though, Congress would not need to act to 
ensure that agencies’ redelegations aligned with congressional 
preferences because Economy Act negotiations over 
redelegations would:  
all take place in the shadow of congressional oversight. Agency offi-
cials would know that if powerful legislators disagreed with the agen-
cies’ decisions—and cared enough about the jurisdictional arrange-
ment for the regulatory problem at hand—the legislators would 
reverse the bureaucrats. Thus, executive agencies would likely con-
sider congressional preferences when entering into redelegation 
agreements in the first place.338 
Ultimately, the procedural checks that I propose would 
 
 333. See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA : From 
Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 54, 88. 
 334. David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, A Theory of Strategic Oversight: 
Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 227, 228 
(1995). 
 335. See Jack M. Beerman, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 61, 121–22 (2006). 
 336. Id. at 134. 
 337. Id. at 68. 
 338. Marisam, supra note 2, at 239–40. 
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help screen out improper redelegations, but they would also 
undeniably lead to regulatory delay. A long line of literature 
has examined how procedural constraints on agency decision-
making can slow down the regulatory process.339 By proposing 
that agency redelegations go through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking and face potential court challenges, I would create 
layers of bureaucracy that would delay agencies’ attempts to 
redelegate authority, even if those redelegations were desirable.  
However, the tradeoff between accountability and regula-
tory delay is necessary here. With broader powers comes a 
greater risk of abuse of those powers, and thus a greater need 
to check those powers. Regulatory delay is a fair price to pay to 
ensure there is no abuse of redelegation powers. 
Moreover, the concern about regulatory delay is mitigated 
somewhat by the fact that I would not subject to additional pro-
cedures run of the mill Economy Act agreements that do not 
involve redelegations. Because these agreements do not involve 
the alteration of agencies’ jurisdictional boundaries, they do not 
raise the same concerns. For example, an agency’s decision to 
redelegate regulatory powers to another agency may violate 
congressional wishes about which agency should regulate, but 
there is no such concern when an ordering agency hires a per-
forming agency to complete a task that the performing agency 
already has the authority to perform on its own. Also, I would 
exempt interagency personnel details from the additional pro-
cedures. These agreements, which agencies have been entering 
into without much ado for well over a century, would continue 
to operate under the relatively light existing procedures.  
In short, if agencies are granted the broader redelegation 
powers that I propose, then it is important to check these pow-
ers with notice-and-comment and judicial review procedures.  
c. Limiting Redelegation from Independent Agencies to Non-
Independent Agencies 
To protect legislative interests, I would bar the 
redelegation of authority from independent agencies to depend-
ent agencies. Currently, the Economy Act does not distinguish 
 
 339. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rule-
making Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387 (1992); see also Jody Freeman & 
Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 70 (2000) (noting that comment responses “required 
considerable agency staff time, slowed the pace of rulemaking, and produced 
unnecessary conflict”). 
 938 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:886 
 
between the different types of agencies operating in the inter-
agency marketplace. Cabinet departments run by officials who 
serve at the pleasure of the President are treated the same as 
independent agencies run by officials that the president can on-
ly remove for cause. There is nothing stopping an independent 
agency from hiring a cabinet department to perform a task for 
it. An agreement between an independent agency and a cabinet 
department is not problematic if the tasks at hand are rote or 
mundane. But from a separation of powers perspective, it may 
be problematic if an independent agency redelegates significant 
decision-making authority to a cabinet department. Congress 
purposefully places authority in independent agencies to keep 
power away from presidential influence.340 Sending power from 
an independent agency to a cabinet department with close ties 
to the President would undermine that congressional intent. 
Thus, to preserve Congress’s power to insulate decision-making 
from the President, the Economy Act should bar the 
redelegation of authority from independent agencies to cabinet 
departments or other dependent agencies. 
The same separation-of-powers problem is not present for 
agreements that run the other way, though. If a cabinet de-
partment chooses to relinquish authority to an independent 
agency, Congress’s interests are not at risk in the same way. 
Congress on occasion may be displeased with these sorts of 
redelegations if it had chosen to place the authority within a 
cabinet department because it wanted to subject that authority 
to greater political influences. But overall, because Congress 
generally has more influence over independent agencies than it 
does over cabinet departments,341 Congress will be less con-
cerned with redelegations from cabinet departments to inde-
pendent agencies. Thus, such redelegations should be allowed.  
Redelegation from one independent agency to another in-
dependent agency presents a trickier problem, though. Inde-
pendent agencies are quite diverse in structure and the degree 
to which they are insulated from presidential influence.342 Thus, 
 
 340. See generally Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: 
What Makes an Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273 
(1993) (proving an “alternative paradigm” of analyzing agency power); Paul R. 
Verkuil, The Purpose and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257 
(analyzing why independent agencies are better suited to run government 
programs assuming their structure is analyzed from a functional standpoint).  
 341. James C. Miller III, A Reflection on the Independence of Independent 
Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 297, 298–99. 
 342. See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The 
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it is difficult to generalize about whether independent agency 
to independent agency redelegations threatens congressional 
interests. Perhaps the best rule here would presumptively al-
low such transfers, but to count on courts to look more closely 
at any redelegations that involve independent agencies. 
Overall, interagency redelegation, when exercised with the 
proper constraints, can improve governmental efficiency with-
out unduly harming accountability and the balance of powers 
among the branches of government. I propose balancing effi-
ciency, accountability, and separation of powers concerns by 
amending the Economy Act to: (1) permit the redelegation of a 
reasonable amount of authority to a qualified agency; (2) sub-
ject all proposed redelegations to notice-and-comment proce-
dures; (3) grant aggrieved parties standing rights in court; and 
(4) bar the redelegation of authority from independent agencies 
to dependent agencies.  
B. AMENDING THE RULES FOR INTERAGENCY FUND TRANSFERS 
In the previous Section, I discussed several rules in the 
Economy Act that constrain interagency fund transfers. In this 
Section, I argue for amending the Economy Act to relax each of 
these constraints. Most importantly, I propose eliminating the 
actual cost rule so that performing agencies can profit from the 
services they provide under Economy Act agreements and ac-
cept nonmonetary consideration in lieu of full reimbursement of 
their actual costs. I also propose replacing the deobligation re-
quirement with looser contractual specificity and timing re-
quirements, and altering the lower-cost rule to give agencies 
discretion to choose between an agency or a private contractor 
when the cost of hiring either one is equal.  
1. Eliminating the Actual Cost Rule to Allow Profits for 
Performing Agencies 
The Economy Act’s actual cost rule prevents performing 
agencies from billing ordering agencies for more than the actu-
al cost of their services.343 While the prospect of public agencies 
reaping profits by offering services in the interagency market-
place may seem distasteful, the prohibition on profits should be 
discarded because it is unsound in theory and costly in practice.  
 
Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 
1111, 1113 (2000) (noting agencies are free “of the political will exemplified by 
the executive branch”).  
 343. See supra Part II.C.1. 
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The actual cost rule is supposed to prevent agencies from 
augmenting their appropriations beyond the amount set by 
Congress.344 Congress’s power to control agency spending is one 
of the most important legislative checks on the executive 
branch.345 Allowing agencies to augment their budgets through 
Economy Act agreements weakens Congress’s ability to control 
agencies by tracking and limiting how much money agencies 
have available to spend.346  
However, the problem with the actual cost rule is that it 
does not actually prevent agencies from augmenting their 
budgets through Economy Act agreements. The rule does pre-
vent performing agencies from augmenting their budgets by 
profiting from their interagency services. However, the rule not 
only permits ordering agencies to augment their budgets be-
yond the amount appropriated by Congress, it actually forces 
them to do so. 
Basic economic principles show how the actual cost rule 
leads to this perverse result. Under economic theory, trade be-
tween two parties generates efficiency gains that the parties 
must decide how to divvy up between themselves.347 Economy 
Act agreements are similar in principle. Efficiency gains are 
generated when an ordering agency hires a performing agency 
to perform a task for less money than it would cost the ordering 
agency to do the job itself.348 However, unlike private trading 
partners, the public agencies have no freedom to decide how to 
divvy up the efficiency gains. By prohibiting the performing 
agency from accepting any amount of money in excess of its ac-
tual costs, the actual cost rule forces all gains to go to the order-
ing agency. 
To illustrate how the actual cost rule in effect shifts all ef-
ficiency gains to the ordering agency, imagine the following hy-
pothetical.349 It would cost the EPA $500 to oversee the cleanup 
of a hazardous waste site. However, the Department of the In-
terior can do the job for only $400. The EPA hires Interior to 
 
 344. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 345. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 346. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 347. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MACROECONOM-
ICS 390–93 (16th ed. 1998). 
 348. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 349. This hypothetical is not far-fetched. The EPA from time to time hires 
Interior to oversee the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. See generally United 
States v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 158 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 1998) (outlining such a 
situation). 
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perform the oversight duties under an Economy Act agreement. 
This agreement generates a net gain of $100—the difference 
between how much it would cost the EPA to perform the over-
sight task and how much it actually cost Interior. How do the 
agencies divvy up this $100 gain? They don’t. The actual cost 
rule prevents them from doing so. Because Interior cannot 
charge anything more than the $400 it spent performing the 
task, the EPA receives the full benefit. That is, the EPA gets to 
keep the $100 it saves from not having to perform the task it-
self. It does not need to negotiate with Interior about how to di-
vide up those savings, like private parties involved in a trans-
action would. As a result, the EPA’s budget is in effect 
augmented by $100, even though Congress did not directly give 
this money to the EPA. This illustrates that the actual cost rule 
does not meet its goal of preventing agencies from augmenting 
their budgets beyond the amount appropriated by Congress. 
One response to my point here is that, while an ordering 
agency may save money by hiring a more efficient agency to do 
work for it, these savings are not the equivalent of a budgetary 
augmentation because no new money is actually delivered to 
the ordering agency. That is, budgetary augmentation can only 
occur when an agency receives money, not when it saves money 
by receiving services. 
The problem with this response is that the distinction be-
tween receiving money and saving money by receiving services 
has no practical effect. Whether an agency saves money by hir-
ing a more efficient agency in the interagency marketplace or 
whether an agency earns the money in the interagency mar-
ketplace, the effect on the agency’s budget is the same: the 
agency has extra money to spend on something else.  
The definitive treatise on appropriations law agrees that 
there is no practical distinction between budgetary augmenta-
tion from receiving money and budgetary augmentation from 
saving money by receiving services.350 The treatise explains: 
“Certainly, if I wash your car without charge or if I give you 
money to have it washed, the result is the same—the car gets 
washed and your own money is free to be used for something 
else.”351 
Even Economy Act jurisprudence claims to adhere to the 
principle that there is no distinction between money received 
 
 350. See REDBOOK, supra note 9, at 6-165. 
 351. Id. 
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directly and money saved. Economy Act case law has estab-
lished that an ordering agency improperly augments its budget 
when it pays the performing agency less than its full costs.352 
Underpayments are said to augment the ordering agency’s 
budget by “free[ing] its funds for other work.”353 This freeing of 
funds occurs because the ordering agency has saved money by 
receiving services it did not pay for.354 Thus, in principle, the 
Economy Act case law claims to recognize that an agency can 
augment its budget by receiving services without receiving 
money directly. 
The problem with this case law is that it operates under 
the fallacy that, if ordering agencies pay performing agencies’ 
full costs, ordering agencies have not freed their funds for other 
work. But this reasoning is wrong if we reasonably assume that 
ordering agencies generally hire performing agencies for tasks 
that the performing agencies can complete more efficiently 
than the ordering agencies can. If an ordering agency pays a 
performing agency its full costs, then the ordering agency saves 
money because it avoids having to use additional resources to 
do the job itself. An ordering agency can save some more money 
by paying the performing agency less than its full costs. But ei-
ther way, the ordering agency saves money. The difference is 
only in degree not kind.  
To illustrate this point, return to the example in which it 
would cost the EPA $500 to oversee cleanup of a hazardous 
chemical site but the EPA saves money by hiring Interior offi-
cials. It costs Interior officials $400 to do the job. If the EPA 
pays the officials the full cost of $400, then the EPA saves $100. 
If the EPA underpays Interior officials, giving them only $300, 
then it saves $200. Under current law, the EPA violates the 
Economy Act and is said to improperly augment its budget if it 
gives Interior officials only $300 but not if it gives them $400. 
But what is the difference? Sure, there is a difference in de-
gree—$200 in savings compared to $100 in savings. But in both 
cases, the EPA saves money and thus frees up funds for other 
work. If freeing up funds for other work without congressional 
authorization is the standard by which one measures improper 
budgetary augmentation—as the Economy Act jurisprudence 
claims that it is—then in both cases, the EPA has improperly 
augmented its budget. 
 
 352. See id. at 12-38 (citation omitted). 
 353. 57 Comp. Gen. 674, 681 n.1 (1978). 
 354. Id. 
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There is only one foolproof way to ensure that neither the 
performing agency nor the ordering agency frees up funds un-
der Economy Act agreements, if that is what Congress really 
wants: mandate that ordering agencies restore to the United 
States Treasury any savings that they generate through Econ-
omy Act agreements. If the EPA were to save $100 by hiring 
Interior officials to oversee cleanup of a site, then it would have 
to deposit $100 in the Treasury, thus forgoing any share of the 
gains generated by the interagency agreement.  
The problem with this approach is that it would undermine 
the very purpose of the Economy Act. By stripping ordering 
agencies of the ability to realize any share of the efficiency 
gains generated by Economy Act agreements, these agencies 
would have no financial incentive to seek out such agreements 
in the first place. Agencies would surely hesitate to jump 
through all the administrative and accounting hoops set up by 
the Economy Act only to have all of the efficiency gains from 
the transaction snatched away. The net result would be fewer 
Economy Act agreements and thus fewer net efficiency gains 
from such agreements. Thus, if Congress truly wants to prevent 
agencies from augmenting their budgets under Economy Act 
agreements, then it would have to draft an amendment to the 
Economy Act that would devastate the very interagency prac-
tices that the statute was enacted to promote in the first place. 
Ultimately, a commitment to a robust market for inter-
agency services requires allowing some budgetary augmenta-
tion. Once this is understood, the question becomes whether 
there is any reason to maintain the current rule that allows 
agencies to augment their budgets by saving money after they 
obtain services from a more efficient agency but not by receiv-
ing profits after they provide services for other agencies. As I 
just discussed, there is no principled reason to distinguish be-
tween receiving money and receiving services in this way. The 
damage to congressional control of an agency’s budget is the 
same in both cases because in both cases the agency frees up 
funds to spend elsewhere. In short, the Economy Act’s ban on 
profits in the interagency marketplace is theoretically unsound.  
The ban is also practically unsound. Because the actual 
cost rule prevents agencies from boosting their budgets by 
providing interagency services, budget-minded agency officials 
have no financial motivation to take the time to negotiate and 
finalize interagency agreements for their services. They may 
have other motivations to enter into these agreements—for ex-
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ample, they may care about overall government efficiency or 
they may want to build and maintain cooperative relationships 
with other government agencies.355 But without the potential to 
earn profits, a key financial motivation for agencies to offer in-
teragency services is missing. 
Abandoning the Economy Act’s ban on profits would, for 
the first time, create financial incentives for performing agen-
cies to offer their services under the Economy Act. These mone-
tary incentives should entice more performing agencies to enter 
into and possibly seek out Economy Act agreements—a good 
outcome if one assumes that performing agencies are usually 
hired because they are more efficient than ordering agencies. 
Of course, with potential profits on the table, ordering agencies 
and performing agencies would have to negotiate the perform-
ing agency’s price instead of having that price set by the actual 
cost rule. But as sophisticated, repeat players in the interagen-
cy marketplace, there is no reason to think that agencies would 
have difficulty settling on reasonably efficient ways to divide 
the gains generated by Economy Act agreements.  
In the end, the current ban on profits in the interagency 
marketplace is theoretically unsound. The Economy Act should 
be amended to allow performing agencies to realize some share 
of the efficiency gains generated under Economy Act agree-
ments.  
2. Eliminating the Actual Cost Rule to Permit Nonmonetary 
Consideration 
Aside from barring profits, the actual cost rule also pre-
vents ordering agencies from offering nonmonetary considera-
tion in lieu of some or all of the performing agencies’ actual 
costs.356 I suggest eliminating this restriction on nonmonetary 
consideration. Removing this restriction could generate an in-
crease in efficient Economy Act agreements.  
Agencies are not purely or even primarily motivated by 
larger budgets.357 Agencies have many desires that have little 
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 356. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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or nothing to do with money.358 Because of these nonmonetary 
motivations, agencies may be willing to perform tasks for non-
monetary consideration. For example, a performing agency may 
want to perform tasks in exchange for a promise that the order-
ing agency refrain from activities that interfere or conflict with 
the performing agency’s regulatory functions.359 Or a perform-
ing agency may want to perform tasks in exchange for a prom-
ise that the ordering agency will consult with the performing 
agency before making decisions relevant to the task at hand.  
By prohibiting these sorts of arrangements, the actual cost 
rule effectively scuttles what could be efficient interagency 
agreements. Indeed, eliminating the restriction on non-
monetary consideration could lead to more Economy Act 
agreements that benefit both agencies and the public. To illus-
trate, imagine a scenario in which the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (MSHA) is preparing to issue rules for miners’ 
exposure to asbestos.360 The EPA, knowing MSHA lacks its ex-
pertise studying and regulating chemicals like asbestos, offers 
to help study the problem of miners’ exposure to asbestos. 
However, MSHA is not prepared to pay for the EPA’s services. 
Instead, the agencies agree that the EPA will perform the 
study and MSHA will promise to use the study to draft regula-
tions that are coordinated with the EPA’s general regulations 
on asbestos emissions under the Clean Air Act.361 Ultimately, 
the EPA benefits from MSHA’s interagency coordination ef-
forts, MSHA benefits from the EPA’s expertise, and the public 
benefits from smarter and better coordinated regulations. More 
benefits could also accrue later if the agreement improved co-
operation among the agencies down the road.  
Abandoning the restriction on nonmonetary consideration 
would prove particularly beneficial if agencies were granted the 
broader redelegation powers that I argued for earlier. If the re-
strictions on redelegation and nonmonetary consideration were 
relaxed, it would further free agencies to enter into agreements 
that do not involve the exchange of money but are nevertheless 
efficient. Imagine a hypothetical agreement involving the Fed-
 
 358. See Marisam, supra note 2, at 211. 
 359. Agencies often care about protecting their turf from interagency inter-
ference. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
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 360. MSHA has this authority under the Mine Safety and Health Act. 30 
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 361. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2006).  
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eral Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Depart-
ment of the Interior. FERC has the authority to regulate and 
license hydropower projects in federal oceans.362 The Depart-
ment of the Interior has the authority to lease federal ocean 
space for hydropower projects.363 The two agencies enter into an 
Economy Act agreement under which Interior redelegates its 
hydropower leasing authority to FERC. Interior benefits by 
having FERC perform the leasing function. FERC benefits be-
cause, by coupling the leasing function with its licensing func-
tion, FERC can avoid the bureaucratic hassle that comes from 
having to coordinate its process for approving hydropower pro-
jects with Interior’s approval process. Agencies should be al-
lowed to enter into these sorts of arrangements in which each 
agency benefits but no money is exchanged.  
Ultimately, performing agencies will sometimes be perfect-
ly happy to receive as consideration something other than mon-
ey. The Economy Act should be amended to let performing 
agencies accept some nonmonetary benefits instead of full re-
imbursement of their costs.  
Agencies could make troubling promises under these sorts 
of arrangements, though. The primary risk here is that an or-
dering agency, instead of promising to pay the performing 
agency money, could promise to act in legally objectionable 
ways. For example, an ordering agency’s promise not to inter-
fere with a performing agency’s operations could run afoul of 
the law if it meant that the ordering agency avoided taking 
regulatory actions that it was statutorily required to take. 
However, the benefits from allowing nonmonetary considera-
tion should outweigh this risk, particularly given that courts 
can weed out some of the problematic nonmonetary promises 
under existing APA provisions that allow for judicial review of 
agency inaction.364 
Ultimately, when my proposal to eliminate the restriction 
on nonmonetary consideration is combined with the proposal to 
eliminate the actual cost rule’s ban on profits, there is nothing 
 
 362. 16 U.S.C. § 817 (2006) (granting the Commission the power to review 
construction proposals over streams). 
 363. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–56 (2006). 
 364. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006) (giving courts permission to “compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed”); see also Eric 
Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency 
Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 461–62 (2008) (showing “no fun-
damental difference between judicial review of agency inaction or action under 
the APA”). 
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left of the actual cost rule. My proposals would let performing 
agencies receive both more and less than their actual costs. 
Taken together, my proposals would eliminate the actual cost 
rule entirely.  
3. The Deobligation Rule 
The deobligation rule requires agencies to pay performing 
agencies with funds available for the fiscal year in which the 
services were provided.365 As a result, ordering agencies some-
times lose the ability to spend funds that they had obligated to 
pay performing agencies because those funds expired when the 
performing agency’s actions unexpectedly stretched into a new 
fiscal year. The purpose of the deobligation rule is to prevent 
agencies from extending the life of their appropriations beyond 
the time limit set by Congress. The deobligation rule ensures 
that agencies cannot subvert congressional control of agency 
spending by using funds to purchase services after the funds 
have expired. But there are better ways to protect congression-
al control of agency spending without deterring efficient agency 
exchanges. I advocate replacing the deobligation requirement 
with a two-part test that screens interagency agreements for 
contractual specificity and requires performing agencies to ful-
fill their duties within a reasonable amount of time.  
The deobligation rule is not necessary to prevent agencies 
from extending the life of their funds. Other statutes that ena-
ble agencies to transfer funds are exempt from the deobligation 
requirement.366 These statutes are far less comprehensive than 
the Economy Act. They generally authorize only one specific 
agency to receive a limited set of services from other agencies. 
Nevertheless, agencies tend to prefer to use these non-Economy 
Act statutes whenever they can for the plain reason that trans-
actions under these statutes are not subject to the deobligation 
requirement. Indeed, agencies routinely ask for opinions from 
the Comptroller General on whether interagency services can 
be provided under non-Economy Act statutes instead of the 
Economy Act so as to avoid the deobligation requirement.367  
 
 365. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 366. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of Defense 
to reimburse other federal agencies for assistance in closing military bases); 42 
U.S.C. § 301 (authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to con-
tract with other agencies for medical research). 
 367. See, e.g., Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., B-167790, 1977 WL 12105 
(Comp. Gen. Sept. 22, 1977); Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 55 Comp. Gen. 
1497 (1976). 
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Without the deobligation requirement, how do these non-
Economy Act statutes stop agencies from abusing their spend-
ing powers by extending the life of their appropriations? They 
do so in two ways. First, the Comptroller General requires that 
the interagency agreements are “sufficiently specific and 
devinitive [sic] to show the purposes and scope of the contract 
finally to be executed.”368 Second, the Comptroller General does 
not allow performing agencies to deliver services at any future 
time. They have only a “reasonable period of time.”369 For ex-
ample, in one case, the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investiga-
tion Board had hired the General Services Administration to 
provide the Board’s officials with identification cards.370 Howev-
er, the Comptroller General invalidated the contract because it 
“does not specify a period of performance for the agreement or 
for the services and does not specify the price for products and 
services to be provided under the agreement.”371 
Taken together, the specificity and time requirements pre-
vent agencies from improperly extending the life of their ap-
propriations without the harsh consequences of the 
deobligation rule. By requiring sufficient specificity of the ser-
vices requested, an agency cannot obligate funds for some 
vague anticipated need. It must be able to state precisely what 
it requires at the time it enters into the contract. Even if an 
agency can anticipate its future needs with specificity, the per-
forming agency only has a “reasonable time” to fulfill its side of 
the bargain. The net effect is that an agency cannot avoid con-
gressional time limits on spending merely by setting aside 
funds for future use.  
At the same time, the rules give agencies some wiggle room 
to enter into interagency contracts without fear of losing their 
funds the minute a fiscal year expires. Imagine a scenario in 
which it is twenty days before the end the fiscal year. An order-
ing agency has a need for a specific service. It hires a perform-
ing agency to provide that service and obligates funds to pay 
the performing agency. It turns out that it takes the performing 
agency thirty days to provide the service, meaning that the per-
 
 368. Adm’r Veterans Admin., B-127518 (Comp. Gen. May 10, 1956), avail-
able at http://redbook.gao.gov/7/fl0033226.php. 
 369. Dep’t of Def., B-308944, 2007 WL 2120292, (Comp. Gen. July 17, 
2007). 
 370. Gen. Serv. Admin., B-318425, 2009 WL 5184705 (Comp. Gen. Dec. 8, 
2009). 
 371. Id. 
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forming agency’s duties under the interagency agreement were 
fulfilled ten days into a new fiscal year. Under the deobligation 
rule, the ordering agency would lose access to the obligated 
funds because those funds would have expired with the passing 
of the fiscal year. The agency would have to pay the performing 
agency using funds available for the new fiscal year. By con-
trast, under the specificity and time requirements that I pro-
pose, the ordering agency could still pay using the originally ob-
ligated funds because the ordering agency had a specific need 
at the time the interagency agreement was made and the per-
forming agency provided that need within a month, which is 
surely a reasonable amount of time to provide almost any in-
teragency service.  
Ultimately, Congress should amend the Economy Act to 
replace the deobligation rule with the specificity and time re-
quirements that I propose. These requirements can protect 
congressional control of agency spending while still allowing 
agencies some leeway when it comes to obligating funds for in-
teragency services.  
4. Amending the Lower-cost rule 
The lower-cost rule prevents agencies from obtaining ser-
vices in the interagency marketplace when a private firm can 
do the job at the same or lower cost.372 I argue that the lower-
cost rule is needlessly biased in favor of private contractors, 
and it should be replaced by a rule that gives the ordering 
agency discretion to choose between another agency or a pri-
vate contractor when both can provide the needed service at the 
same cost. 
The lower-cost rule properly bars an ordering agency from 
using another agency when a private contractor would be 
cheaper. After all, the Economy Act is supposed to save the 
government money, not cost it more. But if the work estimates 
from the agency and private contractor are the same, why force 
the agency to pick the private party? The agency may prefer to 
pick another agency for many perfectly justifiable reasons. For 
example, the agency may have a good working relationship and 
a history of valuable cooperation with the other agency. Or the 
agency may have recently received high quality services from 
the other agency in the past.  
Ordering agencies should have discretion to make contrac-
 
 372. See supra Part II.C.3. 
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tual decisions based on these sound factors, so long as the pri-
vate contractor and public agency can do the job for the same 
costs.  
Amending the lower-cost rule need not be a high priority, 
though. In practice, the rule probably does very little to bias 
orders in favor of private contractors because ordering agencies 
have leeway to find ways to hire another agency instead of a 
private contractor if they so choose. Ordering agencies must 
make the lower cost determination on their own.373 They do not 
need to request bids from private contractors and other agen-
cies and then compare the bids.374 If an ordering agency’s inter-
nal “determination and findings” estimate that another agency 
could do the job more cheaply than a private contractor or that 
the private contractor cannot provide exactly what the agency 
needs, the ordering agency can then hire the agency instead of 
the contractor.375  
If the ordering agency wants to contract with another 
agency instead of a private contractor, it is not too difficult to 
make that happen. Nevertheless, if Congress decides to amend 
the Economy Act generally, it would be easy for it to also fix the 
lower-cost rule by allowing agencies discretion to choose other 
agencies when the cost of doing so would be no different than 
the cost of hiring a private firm.  
  CONCLUSION   
During the Great Depression, Congress and the White 
House sought ways to make government more efficient.376 As 
part of this effort, Congress passed the Economy Act of 1932 to 
invigorate the interagency marketplace and improve govern-
mental efficiencies.377 Congress and the White House are more 
serious about improving governmental efficiencies today than 
at any other time since then.378 They are looking to save money 
in nearly all areas of agency spending.379 Once again, Congress 
and the White House should look to improve the efficiency of 
 
 373. Seattle Laundry & Dry Cleaning Inst., 37 Comp. Gen. 16 (1957). 
 374. Id. 
 375. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 376. See supra Part II. 
 377. See supra Part II. 
 378. H.R. REP. NO. 72-1126, at 1 (“[W]e are now confronted with industrial 
stagnation, unemployment, a period of low commodity prices, and swindling, if 
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the interagency marketplace. Some of the rules governing the 
interagency marketplace are misguided or outdated. In particu-
lar, I propose broadening interagency redelegation powers to 
better enable agencies to fix inefficient jurisdictional arrange-
ments by transferring authority to the agency best positioned 
to regulate. So long as adequate procedural checks and safe-
guards are built into the interagency marketplace, broader 
redelegation powers can improve efficiencies without unduly 
harming public accountability or the balance of powers among 
the branches. I also propose lifting the ban on profits from ser-
vices provided in the interagency marketplace. Efficiency gains 
are often generated when agencies hire other, more expert 
agencies to provide services for them. There is no principled 
reason why the agencies providing the services should not be 
able to recover some share of the governmental savings gener-
ated by these interagency agreements. Indeed, lifting the ban 
on profits would provide a financial incentive for more agencies 
to enter into efficiency-enhancing interagency transactions.  
